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THE TRAJECTORY OF "NORMAL" AFTER 9/11:




Cultures are not static phenomena like the laws of nature;
they are human creations that undergo a continuous proc-
ess of evolution. They can be modified by economic de-
velopment, wars and other national traumas, immigration
or by conscious choice.
2
I may never again see a plane fly over a city skyscraper
without registering some small tic of worry. I have trou-
ble imagining the "normal" that we can go back to. I
have equal trouble imagining life on endless high alert or
imagining anxiety as my central vision.
3
1. Professor of Law and Director, Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Center
of Environmental Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I
wish to extend my sincerest thanks to the editors of the Fordham
Environmental Law Journal for the invitation to take part in their
outstanding "Terror in the Air" symposium and for their wonderful
hospitality. I would like to thank the psychologists who contributed
to and inform this Article: Dr. Gordon Henry and Dr. Susan Donner
for helping me understand the field, and Dr. Robert Resnick for dis-
cussing "trauma" with me and introducing me to the major compre-
hensive databases of psychology abstracts and articles. I am grateful
to Derek Jinks for helping me untangle the complexities of law and
behavioral economics. This Article was supported by a research
grant from the School of Law, to which I also offer my gratitude.
2. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST
MAN 222 (1992).
3. Ellen Goodman, An Anxious Respite in a Season of War,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2002, at A19.
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What is a "national trauma" and how will we be changed by it?
This question in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 suggests the
enormous scope of the answer. Certain events are so massive in their
impact that the legal course of society is dramatically altered.4 What
"modifications" should we expect after those events? Do "national
traumas" produce sharp discontinuities in the nation's legal evolu-
tion?
Without minimizing the current challenges of the war on terror,
there is ample reason to think there will be a considerable transfor-
mation in public discourse and policy in the long term. A poll con-
ducted one year following 9/11 found that a majority of Americans
believe "things were not at all back to normal" and they never would
be.5 This is not to imply that there is anything resembling a "silver
lining" about 9/11; instead, it suggests that traumatic events lead to
major changes in our social fabric. 6A traumatic event can be a pow-
erful force for change. Scholars believe, for example, that 9/11
"connected Americans in ways they have not been connected since
4. I recognize that this presents a line drawing problem. Some
cataclysmic events - 9/11 and past armed conflicts - would have to
count, but what about major natural disasters or the Oklahoma City
bombing? This problem is readily apparent in the claims of victims
of Oklahoma City that they too should be eligible for the federal
compensation offered to 9/11 victims. See Michael Kinsley, Justice
a la Carte, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A23.
5. 9/11 Poll: Majority say [sic] U.S. not back to normal,
CNN.com at http://www.cnn.com/2002/us/09/01/poll.9. 1/idex.html
(last viewed Sept. 1, 2002).
6. Unfortunately, in this charged climate, I am aware that simply
saying we might change anything as a result of 9/11 might make me
seem a soulmate of those who argue that we "caused" 9/11. See
generally NOAM CHOMSKY, 9-11 (Greg Ruggiero ed., 2002); M.
Mitchell Waldrop, The Relentless Revolutionary, TECH. REV., Mar.
2002, at 9 (recounting a speech in which Prof. Chomsky "spent 90
minutes documenting his claim that the United States was guilty of
profound hypocrisy on human rights," and noting that "he strongly
implied ... that the terrorist attacks of September 11 were the pro-
verbial chickens come home to roost..."); A. Barton Hinkle, GMU
Should Have Invited Fisk Some Other Time, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 10, 2002, at A9 (criticizing the views of British newspaper
writer Robert Fisk and others). I believe no such thing.
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World War 11.,, 7 However, some believe the changes were tempo-
rary and we have reverted to the status quo ante. 8 In this Article, I
disagree with the first proposition, and conclude that it is too soon to
conduct a postmortem for 9/11.
This inquiry begs a larger question: if it is plausible or even likely
that change will occur, what form will it take? I believe that focus-
ing on the character of 9/11 as a traumatic event may yield some
answers. Upon deeper analysis of the relationship between the resil-
ience of our nation and our ability to recover from post-traumatic
stress, we might be able to hypothesize about long-term changes. In
this Article, I use the literature that describes how trauma affects us
and how we deal with it as a paradigmatic lens through which to
imagine the legal future. My hope is that we might find a nation that
will adapt in an identifiable way to the new emerging reality.
Unfortunately, this inquiry does not yield easy answers. Due to the
dynamic field of trauma study, involving the best efforts of psy-
chologists, psychiatrists, biologists, and chemists, the extent of the
landscape itself has been rapidly changing in recent years. Estab-
lished notions of what constitutes trauma and how we recover from
it are undergoing intense scrutiny. As a result, there is considerable
debate about the process of how we deal with traumatic events. Ag-
gregating these new ideas about trauma at the societal level requires
extrapolation; scholars spanning a variety of academic disciplines
have begun to offer ideas about the impacts of traumatic events on
the nation.
9
7. An Uncertain Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, § 4, at 14
(discussing the views of noted author Robert Putnam).
8. See id. (claiming that the opportunity to capitalize upon the
"heightened political consciousness, [increase] in trust for the federal
government," and other beneficial effects of 9/11 identified by Put-
nam has been squandered since the aftermath of the attacks).
9. For example, scholars in the field of "political psychology"
have done much to help us understand the psychological conse-
quences of what we would ordinarily think of as political events. To
date, the field has been most helpful in describing the psychological
effects of events such as war and the Holocaust. However, going
beyond that to predict social change as a result of traumatic events
requires more work. See, e.g., Cheryl Koopman, Political Psychol-
ogy as a Lens for Viewing Traumatic Events, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 831
(1997).
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In this evolving interface between law and psychology, there may
be some useful touchstones for discussing the aftermath of 9/11.
These rest on two debatable propositions that are the focus of this
Article: first, that the field of trauma study can predict the reaction of
an entire nation to 9/11, as differentiated from reactions to more cir-
cumscribed traumatic events studied extensively over the last quar-
ter-century (such as the individual experiences of rape victims and
Vietnam veterans); and second, that we can extend ideas about
trauma and recovery that largely address a process of repairing the
self, to describe and possibly even predict the development of poli-
cies in the public sphere.
I believe we can begin to develop a "post-traumatic societal adap-
tation" model of legal evolution with which we enhance our under-
standing of how major dislocations in the course of the nation's his-
tory and associated processes of recovery may affect the trajectory of
public policy. This term quite deliberately mimics the term for the
syndrome affecting trauma victims that is probably familiar to many
Americans: post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). The reason for
this is that I propose to describe indicia of the likely direction of so-
cietal change brought about by a severe "stressor" (or, more collo-
quially, "shock") such as 9/11. Due to this Article's focus on an ex-
amination of major episodic stressors, I will not posit a macroscopic
all-encompassing theory such as that brought to the legal literature
by students of evolutionary biology or complexity theory for the
process of post-traumatic societal adaptation.' The process of post-
10. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and
Biology Meet: Of Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective
Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 28 (1993) (aiming to "introduce some
of the recent findings of evolutionary biology to the legal community
and to urge their consideration in developing a more effective law");
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lessons of the Red Squirrel: Consensus
and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 161 (1989); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the
Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the
Environmental Statutes, 4 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
377 (1989); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in
Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal
the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of
Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997); J. B. Ruhl,
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:
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traumatic societal adaptation, however, will share one common fea-
ture with these ideas. This field of trauma study tells us more about
ourselves as human beings, so it can help us understand how we will
bring about legal change via adapting to a new post-9/11 world. As
a result of the nature of this inquiry, I begin to describe adaptation
that will take place over a long period of time, the focus being on the
possibility for broader societal change after 9/11, not short-term re-
sponses.
I shall evaluate some of the wide-ranging psychological effects of
9/1111 to further flesh out the concept that 9/11 is a "national
trauma," in pursuit of a more sophisticated understanding intended to
supplant the traditional concept of "trauma" so often associated with
events of this caliber. Before 9/11, most people thought post-
traumatic stress was something Vietnam veterans' (or perhaps rape
victims 13) suffered. As I describe in Part I, this is squarely at odds
How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environ-
mental Law, 34 Hous. L. REV. 933, 969-75 (1997) (applying com-
plex adaptive system theory to environmental law). See generally
Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of the Ecologi-
cal Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 847, 849-70 (1994).
11. By total coincidence, just as I wrote this clause my computer
alerted me to a breaking story from the Wall Street Journal indicat-
ing that New Yorkers were experiencing a "second wave" of trauma;
visits to psychologists and psychiatrists had begun to spike up, and
residents in major cities were still worried about terrorist attacks.
Lucette Lagnado, Bracing For 9/11 Trauma's Second Wave, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2002, at B 1.
12. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans of America, VVA's Guide on
PTSD, at http://www.vva.org/Benefits/ptsd.htm#Whatis (citing
PTSD is "often associated with Vietnam veterans"). Before 1980,
PTSD was often termed "post-Vietnam syndrome" for this very rea-
son. See Fred Lemer, The Unending Trauma: A Librarian's Guide to
PTSD, Nat'l Ctr. for PTSD, at http://www.ncptsd.org/treatment/
resourcecenter/unendingjtrauma.html (last viewed March 23,
2000).
13. See JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 32 (Basic
Books 1997) (1942) (noting that once PTSD was recognized as a
disorder affecting Vietnam veterans, psychological trauma inflicted
on women could be seen as strikingly similar).
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with recent research that shows such trauma is common.14 I will
discuss current literature reflecting on post-traumatic stress and the
associated disorder (post-traumatic stress disorder, or "PTSD"), and,
in Part H, I will propose a mechanism to describe who might lead
legal change and what change might take place. I shall also discuss
a specific application of the model, namely energy policy and the
concept of "energy independence" in the wake of 9/11.
This model, because it is based on suppositions about human be-
havior, necessitates a reference in this Article to the growing contro-
versy over the nascent field of "law and behavioral economics." In
Part III, I evaluate the model in light of some of the major criticisms
leveled at that scholarship, as well as other possible drawbacks.
There I find that this effort to mesh law and behavior, like others, is
commendable even though the generalizations inherent in doing so
threaten to undermine such effort. This not only leaves many more
questions than answers, but also indicates elements of a productive
research agenda that may well occupy and utilize the talents of sci-
entists, historians, legal scholars and others for years to come.
I. POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS AND 9/11
When people think of post-traumatic stress disorder, they
might think of Robert De Niro in Taxi Driver, waving a
gun at the mirror, shouting, "You lookin' at me?". . . But
then, we've never been through a period quite like this
one. 15
I begin with what must seem most obvious: 9/11 will produce so-
cietal change, and we need only discern what that change will be. I
am hardly the first to say this.' 6 For the moment, the war with Iraq
and the threat of terror at home dominates current discussion. This
is not surprising. Concerted responses to threats of terror are indis-
pensable to the existence of a pluralistic republic such as our own.
14. See infra Part I.
15. Alex Markels, Can You Deal?, MEN'S J., Dec. 2001, at 71.
16. After 9/11, the inevitable slew of "what happened, why, and
where are we going" books began to appear, sometimes cobbled to-
gether within mere months. See, e.g., THE AGE OF TERROR:
AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (Strobe Talbott
&Nayan Chanda, eds., 2001) [hereinafter AGE OF TERROR].
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We may have fractious disputes about issues such as diversity, but if
we cannot unite to deal with a threat, we are doomed. 17 Responding
to terrorism has already produced enough changes in such areas as
airport security 18 that indicates post-9/11 America will not go back
to "normal," no matter how much some politicians and pundits say
we should or could. 19 The question on everyone's mind is what the
new "normal" will be, whether the topic is the balance between civil
liberties and homeland defense, the role of the military, the makeup
of our intelligence-gathering structure, or any other formulation.2 °
17. This is not to say that there is always unity in our response to
the threat, as, for example, those concerned that actions taken in the
name of national security risk abridging fundamental civil liberties
have argued. For a small sample of the many commentaries on these
issues, see National Security and Civil Liberties: How to Strike the
Balance?, at http://www.duke.edu/web/forums (last visited Oct. 31,
2003) (comments of Duke Univ. law professor Walter Dellinger that
"he was particularly concerned with the use of racial profiling and
'how we treat immigrants."'); Eric Pianin &Thomas B. Edsall, Civil
Liberties Debate Revived Amid Efforts to Fight Terrorism, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at All. See JURIST, at http://jurist.
law.pitt.edulterrorism3b.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) (providing
an in-depth collection of materials and links on terrorism and civil
liberties, which is maintained by the University of Pittsburgh Law
School).
18. One of the many examples of actions taken on this front since
9/11 is the establishment of the Transportation Security Administra-
tion ("TSA") within the Department of Transportation to handle pas-
senger screening and related issues. See Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. (Nov. 19, 2001) (estab-
lishing the TSA); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MEETING THE AIRPORT
SECURITY CHALLENGE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S RAPID
RESPONSE TEAM ON AIRPORT SECURITY (2001), available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/airportsec.htm (last viewed Oct. 31,
2003) (recommending the establishment of the federal security
agency).
19. See, e.g., Peggy Noonan, Bush's Text and Subtext, WALL ST.
J., May 29, 2002, at A20 ("They asked us to return to normal and we
did.").
20. Many interesting issues have received a post-terrorism spin.
My law school held a post-9/11 symposium on the propriety of as-
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We seem to take the likelihood of this transformation for granted,
but rarely acknowledge one reason we will change: we have suffered
through a traumatic event. Since 9/11, I have had many opportuni-
ties to tell friends, colleagues, and acquaintances about my interest in
the connection between post-traumatic stress and the attacks. When
I use "trauma" and "9/11" in the same sentence, I am usually met
with a kind of puzzled look, the first response, almost universally,
has been: what possible connection can there be to the law?
The preliminary step in delving into this mystery begins with my
offering of my personal experience and subsequent efforts to cope
2 1
with 9/11 by learning about trauma and recovery.
A. The "Murderous Rage" and "Trauma"
On December 13, 2001, I flew into a hot, murderous rage while
watching a cable news channel. In that moment, I was Meursault
with the sun glinting in my eye; 22 Kurt Russell saving his wife and
sassinating a foreign leader. See Allen Chair Symposium: Terrorism
and Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2003).
21. I am hardly the only one to personalize 9/11, as is evident
from the many post-9/11 books. See, e.g., AFTERWORDS: STORIES
AND REPORTS FROM 9/11 AND BEYOND (Salon.com eds., 2002).
Much of what is available consists of first person accounts memori-
alized within days or weeks of 9/11. It is obviously important to
share these experiences, as we continue to do on the anniversaries of
9/11. Simple expediency also accounts for much of the books' focus
on the immediate aftermath: newspapers and magazines commis-
sioned books that used what was available. At some point, however,
we will turn to examining longer-term consequences, and to that end
I have offered my own experience as a possible starting point. As
we will see, in discussing my own recovery process I use the word
"cope" quite deliberately, for I have come to recognize that I am go-
ing through the process that trauma experts describe as coping. See
infra note 92 and accompanying text. It almost goes without saying
that my discussions with friends, family and strangers were in them-
selves a form of coping.
22. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Stuart Gilbert trans., Vin-
tage Books 1946).
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confronting the bad guys in "Breakdown. ' 23 I am hardly given to
such fits of anger, and my reaction surprised me at that moment and
remains a source of curiosity to this day. The target of my anger was
Osama bin Laden, featured in a videotape making anti-American,
anti-Western statements while claiming credit for his orchestration
of the attacks on the United States. Fortunately for me, when I saw
the videotape there was no one else present. Had Mr. bin Laden
been nearby I felt sure I would have taken the opportunity to attack
him myself.
24
I had a number of intense reactions to 9/11, foremost among them
a concern for my relative trapped in a New York airport and grief for
an acquaintance who lost her life in the Pentagon attack. This out-
burst was the first time I was prompted to wonder whether I should
seek help. I "cooled down" over the next day or so and began to
question whether this anger might be part of some larger phenome-
non. I did not think of myself as "traumatized" by 9/11, but I cer-
tainly was affected. I spent virtually an entire month glued to the
television, looking for any information about the attacks and for
clues whether new ones were coming. I ran up a large phone bill
communicating with my loved ones and friends. Like many other
Americans, I found it hard to work. I put aside the research already
underway, 25 and spent that first month nearly paralyzed by my reac-
23. BREAKDOWN (Paramount 1997). I did not pick this movie
idly. It portrays a situation that brings on the ultimate in psychologi-
cal terror: the random kidnapping of a loved one (in this case, a
spouse). Kurt Russell, playing the husband, is "baffled and angered
by the disappearance of his wife." See Roger Ebert, Breakdown,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, available at http://www.suntimes.com/ebert/
ebertreviews/1997/05/050202.html (last viewed Oct. 31, 2003).
24. Apparently I am not the only one feeling this way. A poll
taken in July 2002 found that 45% of those responding would at-
tempt to kill Mr. bin Laden if given the chance. See Poll: Americans
Uncertain They Would Kill Osama, FOXNews.com, available at
http://foxnews.con/story/0,2933,58211,00.html (last viewed July 19,
2002); see also HERMAN, supra note 13, at 189 (noting that revenge
fantasies are a common but incomplete way of mourning traumatic
loss).
25. Which, fortuitously, happened to be related to the intersection
of law and behavior. This made it easier to think about some of the
2003]
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tion. When I returned to a higher level of productivity, I resolved to
learn as much as I could about the nature of this personal detour
from normal behavior, and to address the needs of those who felt
pain, suffering and loss resulting from 9/11.26
1. The "Third Wave" of Trauma Study
Unfortunately, I found it no easy matter to understand the literature
relating to traumatic events. In part this is due to the field's confus-
ing evolution. The history of trauma study is cyclical, starting with
the pioneering work of Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet on hysteriain the late nineteenth century.27 After the focus on hysteria waned,
trauma next attracted attention during World War I when the ghastly
impact on soldiers could not be easily explained by the turn-of-the-
century predilections concerning war.28  The study of neuroses
brought on by combat had brief notoriety. A mere thirty years ago,
behavioral ramifications of 9/11 and their intersection with the law.
See infra Part III.
26. One could see this drive as therapeutic. See HERMAN, supra
note 13, at 58-59 (noting that having a high degree of resilience and
making use of it as an opportunity for "purposeful action in concert
with others" is a factor in determining why some people do not ex-
perience PTSD). But one could also call it luck; if I had not been
studying behavior and law already I might have missed this opportu-
nity. Id. at 60 (no one personality trait is essential to survival and
luck may be an important factor).
27. Id. at 10-15 (discussing the rise and fall of the study of hys-
teria). Hysteria was thought of as a strange women's disease (even
its name relates to female anatomy), but Freud and Breuer discov-
ered separately that it was psychological trauma that caused hysteria.
Id. at 12. Later in the twentieth century, there was much commen-
tary on how it is ridiculous to make up a psychological disease that
only afflicts women. Still, even today, some are willing to reexplore
the possibility that hysteria exists. This fascination shows just how
difficult it is to get a proper handle on the nature of mental disorders,
let alone treat them.
28. Id. at 20-26. See generally Maj. Susan L. Turley, A War of
Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century, 170
MIL. L. REV. 197 (2001) (discussing a book detailing the uneasy
relationship between mental health professionals and the military).
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one could point to only a few volumes about trauma. 29 It was not
until Vietnam veterans experienced problems that trauma began to
attract attention again.
30
Currently, many see the past quarter-century as a "third wave" of
trauma study. 3 1 Since the 1970s the field has expanded dramatically,
and with the flowering of research in many directions, virtually rede-
fined itself every few years. Not surprisingly, the literature is wide-
ranging and fragmented. Members of different psychology disci-
plines disagree on basic concepts. In the same collection of work
one can find papers that directly contradict each other. Anything,
even a few years old, might well be controverted by more recent
studies. 32 The basic definition of the best-known illness associated
with trauma - post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") - has been in
a state of flux since its first usage in 1980. 33 Certain absences in
empirical data prevent the articulation of anything approaching a
grand theory. Legal literature and reported cases about post-
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 26. The relatively recent beginning of a resurgence in
trauma study is yet another reason why many still think of post-
traumatic stress as something only Vietnam vets get. Id.
31. See Bessel A. van der Kolk et al., Approaches to the Treat-
ment of PTSD, at http://www.trauma-pages.com/vanderk.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter van der Kolk et al., Treatment
Approaches] (stating that "Over the past decade our profession has
experienced the third intense wave of efforts to grasp the reality of
trauma on body and soul...").
32. See BABETTE ROTHSCHILD, THE BODY REMEMBERS: THE
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY OF TRAUMA AND TRAUMA TREATMENT xv-xvi
(2000) ("The scientific study of the mechanisms of trauma, PTSD,
and memory is accelerating at such a fast pace that it is hard to keep
up. There are sometimes strong disagreements between scientific
groups. What causes and what heals PTSD and how memory sys-
tems function are subject to broad debate. The research-supported
theories of one group are disputed by another and vice versa.").
33. The first usage of the term "PTSD" was in "DSM-III," the
now superseded third edition of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation's standard reference on trauma. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d
ed. 1980).
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traumatic stress date to the 1980s and early 1990s. 34 In light of re-
cent developments, this body of work would seem to warrant re-
examination.
35
This fluidity of scholarship is consistent with active scientific in-
quiry in a relatively new field. The breadth and scope of this dia-
logue is exciting, but may not last. The unhappy history of trauma
study involves peaks of inquiry, followed (sometimes rapidly) by
valleys of retrenchment. Our periodic doubt about trauma reflects
36the confusion trauma victims feel. Traumatic effects are usually
substantiated only by subjective statements about memories supplied
by the victims themselves, thus such discovery yields quickly to at-
tacks on the credibility of patients and investigators. Some reversals
34. Some attention centered on the use of evidence of PTSD in
Vietnam veterans as a defense in criminal cases. See, e.g., Michael
J. Davidson, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial
Defense For Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 415 (1988).
35. An excellent example of how the treatment of PTSD in the
legal system has not kept up with state-of-the-art science is found in
Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The
Science and Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 10 (2001) (noting that evidence of
PTSD, "[c]uriously," is often excluded from evidence "in precisely
those circumstances where it would be the most helpful to the fact-
finder"). See also Roger K. Pitman et al., Legal Issues in Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder, in TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF
OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY AND SOCIETY 378,
392-94 (Bessel A. van der Kolk et al. eds., 1996) (discussing reasons
for the use and misuse of PTSD evidence in criminal cases).
36. See van der Kolk et al., Treatment Approaches, supra note 31
("Mirroring the confusion and disbelief of people whose basic as-
sumptions are shattered by traumatic experiences, the psychiatric
profession periodically has been fascinated by trauma, followed by
sudden disbelief in the importance of trauma in the genesis of psy-
chopathology."); Bessel A. van der Kolk & Alexander C.
McFarlane, The Black Hole of Trauma, in TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE
EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY AND
SOCIETY, supra note 35, at 4. There are many other reasons for so-
cietal challenges to the legitimacy of trauma, some part of which
shall be discussed later in this Article. See infra Part II.
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of position have been sparked by the pioneers themselves, the most
famous being Freud's recantation of his theory of hysteria that
caused the study to fade into obscurity.37 Even in our time, the ten-
sion between belief and disbelief manifests itself in pitched legal
battles about the reliability of memory concerning traumatic events,
perhaps most emphatically, in cases involving childhood sexual
abuse. 3
8
2. Fundamentals of Trauma and PTSD
At the onset of this inquiry, I must start at the foundation of the
field with the word "trauma." The word has always conjured images
of pain and loss one of the most common experiences of the human
condition. 39 In contemporary parlance, "trauma" is discussed casu-
ally. We speak of the "trauma" of not being selected as a cheer-
leader,4 ° of the "trauma" induced by losing a job or going through a
divorce, of the "trauma" brought on by losing a loved one, or of the
"trauma to the head" from a direct blow. The quote at the beginning
of this Article refers to a "national trauma.". Thus, what is trauma?
37. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 12.
38. JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: A GUIDE TO SELF-
UNDERSTANDING 107 (1995). A noteworthy current situation in-
volving controversy over the use of repressed memories, of course,
is the scandal involving Catholic priests accused of molesting young
boys. See, e.g., Sacha Pfeiffer, Crisis in the Church: Shanley set for
Mass. return; Coakley Eyes Roles Conflict, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4,
2002, at Al (citing attorney Roderick MacLeish Jr.'s statement that
"lawsuits alleging abuse by [Rev. Paul R.] Shanley in Newton are
based on recovered or repressed memories ... [and] that such cases
sometimes lend themselves to controversy.").
39. One article notes that "[p]ost traumatic stress has been recog-
nized in the poetry of Homer, Shakespeare and Goethe." van der
Kolk et al., Treatment Approaches, supra note 31.
40. Lest one think I am providing this example in jest, consider
the usage of "trauma" I found in the magazine devoted to tennis, one
of my avocational passions: "While choking away a club title won't
cost you what it does a professional, the trauma of the experience
still exacts a heavy toll in terms of lost confidence and added fear in
future matches." John F. Murray, Rebound Ace, TENNIS, July/Aug.
2002, at 62.
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Consider this definition of a traumatic event from the fourth edition
of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV"), the most widely accepted
standard reference on trauma:
"The person experienced, witnessed or was confronted
with an event or events that involved actual or threatened
death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integ-
rity of self or others; [and] the person's response involved
intense fear, helplessness, or horror."
4 1
Trauma may therefore be considered insufficient as a description
for the failure to become a cheerleader, because there is no serious
injury save for the impact upon teenage pride. Beyond this, it would
seem the DSM-IV definition should be criticized for over-breadth, as
it would make 9/11 a traumatic event to virtually everyone who
watched the news coverage. However, perhaps this is not inappro-
priate. Recent scholarship views traumatic events as more ubiqui-
tous than previously thought, and, for that reason, does not define
42those suffering from post-traumatic stress as abnormal. Yet, as
recently as 1980, the version of the DSM in effect included a state-
ment that trauma was "outside the range of usual human experi-
ence."43 We now know that certain traumatic events such as rape
war, and natural disaster are disturbingly common. 44 This bears im-
41. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
42. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 5. But see Arieh Y. Shalev, Stress
versus Traumatic Stress: From Acute Homeostatic Reactions to
Chronic Psychopathology, in TRAUMATIC STRESS, supra note 35, at
83, 85 (claiming that this conclusion is based on unproven assump-
tions).
43. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 33, (quoting the AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980)).
44. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 8 (citing a variety of studies, includ-
ing a national survey finding that "1 [woman] in 8 reported having
been the victim of forcible rape"). Psychologist Jon G. Allen states
for this reason that rape creates "the largest group of people with
posttraumatic stress disorder in this country." Id. at 8. See also
Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 512 (1992)
(rape "happened to me and to so many others"); Susan Estrich, Rape,
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portant implications for the social acceptance of trauma victims, who
in the past were considered to be outside the societal mainstream,4 5
and also as a result of their treatment. We need different response
options if one departs from the premise that someone who suffers
from trauma is abnormal. 46
There is a subtle but critically important distinction between the
person who experiences a simple head blow and the person who
watches a loved one die. The psychological consequences after the
initial event is the concern, the so-called "intrusion of the past into
the present," as one expert puts it.47 This is hardly a new concept.
Breuer and Freud stated famously that "hysterics suffer mainly from
reminiscences., 48 Janet invented the term "subconscious" to repre-
sent the memories that affect our daily activities,49 and based on his
studies of hundreds of traumatized patients, he described the central
role in post-traumatic stress of a phenomenon which he called "dis-
sociation": the domination of traumatic memories that blocked a pa-
95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (citing firsthand account of rape and
analysis of rape law).
45. Janet, for example, viewed his hysteria patients as abnormal.
See Frank W. Putnam, Pierre Janet and Modem Views of Dissocia-
tion, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON PosTrRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
116, 117 (Mardi J. Horowitz ed., 1999). See also Rachel Yehuda &
Alexander C. McFarlane, Conflict between Current Knowledge
about Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Its Original Conceptual
Basis, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON POSTrRAUMATIC STRESS, supra, at
41, 43 (discussing whether "trauma survivors [were] to be viewed as
psychologically damaged by the experiences that befell them or was
it more appropriate to validate the experience of trauma from a hu-
manistic and existential perspective by viewing their responses as an
adaptation to frightening environmental events.").
46. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 235 ("Given the broad array of prob-
lems, symptoms and disorders associated with traumatic experience,
it should come as no surprise that virtually all major forms of treat-
ment are applicable.").
47. Id. at 4.
48. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 12.
49. Bessel A. van der Kolk et al., History of Trauma in Psychia-
try, in TRAUMATIC STRESS, supra note 35, at 47, 52 [hereinafter van
der Kolk et al., History of Trauma].
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tient's ability to resume normal functioning.50 Freud's recantation of
the role of memories in traumatic events, and subsequent pursuit of
psychoanalytic theory, largely ended the study of this great discov-
ery.51 During most of the twentieth century there were important
studies linking trauma and its psychological consequences, 52 but
there were also unfortunate detours, particularly in the study of com-
bat-related situations. 53 It was not until the 1980s that the relation-
ship between dissociation and traumatic disorders was rediscov-
ered54 and great breakthroughs occurred under the rubric of PTSD.
50. Id. at 53.
51. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 14. See also van der Kolk et al.,
History of Trauma, supra note 49, at 53 ("psychoanalysis . . .
crowded out competing schools of thought," including Janet's theo-
ries). Freud turned to psychoanalysis, and the acceptance of his the-
ory largely ended research on factors other than developmental ones
in trauma in children's lives. Id. at 56. His turn toward a focus on
development has often been misinterpreted, as he continued to be-
lieve that while developmental factors were important there was still
a category of response to trauma called "traumatic neurosis." Ye-
huda & McFarlane, supra note 45, at 43.
52. Yehuda & McFarlane, supra note 45, at 43 (citing a number of
the major studies). Perhaps the most influential scientist working in
these middle years was Abram Kardiner, who discussed war neuro-
ses in veterans of World War I. See van der Kolk et al., History of
Trauma, supra note 49, at 56-58 for a concise description of
Kardiner's work.
53. In 1915, the British military psychiatrist Charles Samuel
Myers coined the term "shell shock" to describe the adverse psycho-
logical consequences of war. van der Kolk et al., History of Trauma,
supra note 49, at 48. While Myers worked to explore the emotional
aspects of combat neuroses, others were often not convinced. The
Germans believed for decades that combat stress was a function of
the failure of a soldier's will to fight. This led doctors to remove
soldiers from the battlefield and give them electric shock therapy
that made it more unpleasant to remain away from the battlefield
than to return to it. Id. at 50; see also Mardi J. Horowitz, Introduc-
tion, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER,
supra note 45, at 19.
54. van der Kolk et al., History of Trauma, supra note 49, at 53.
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The most important revolution in the field involves a focus upon
the "intrusive reliving" of the traumatic event, rather than the event
itself.55 As one leading authority puts it, "it is the subjective experi-
ence of the objective events that constitutes the trauma." 56 My en-
counter with Mr. bin Laden on TV was brief, but produced lasting
effects: for a while, every time I saw a picture of him I became angry
again. Recent work has shown that I was not alone. It is not enough
to simply eliminate the traumatic stressor.57 The mind is altered by
the traumatic experience even after the event has ended, and those
changes must be dealt with successfully if there is to be any resolu-
tion of the individual's relationship to the trauma. It is insufficient
to focus only on the victim's state of mind, for traumatic events also
result in a disconnection between the victim and external society;
they "breach the attachments of family, friendship, love and com-
munity.58
So the changes brought on by a traumatic event are wide-ranging,
and it is difficult to sum them up neatly. The common denominators
in all traumatic events are a high degree of stress and the individual's
feelings of fear and helplessness,5 9 whether the event in question is
55. van der Kolk et al., Treatment Approaches, supra note 31
("Evidence during the past decade supports the notion that it is the
intrusive reliving, rather than the traumatic event itself that is re-
sponsible for the complex biobehavioral change that we call
PTSD."). Both pre- and post-event experiences shape our response
to trauma. See, e.g., Allan N. Schore, Dysregulation of the Right
Brain: A Fundamental Mechanism of Traumatic Attachment and the
Psychopathogenesis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, at
http://www.trauma-pages.com/schore-2002.htm ("[t]he etiology of
PTSD is best understood in terms of what an individual brings to a
traumatic event as well as what he or she experiences afterward, and
not just the nature of the traumatic event itself.").
56. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 14.
57. See, e.g., ROTHSCHILD, supra note 32, at 4-14 (describing how
the "body remembers traumatic experiences" in the context of a case
called "Charlie and the Dog").
58. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 51.
59. Id. at 33 (quoting N.C. Andreason, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, 918-24
(H.I. Kaplan and B.J. Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985).
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rape, combat or terrorist attack.60 No two people react the same;6'
there are as many symptoms as human reactions in the face of terror.
Symptoms can, and do, fluctuate over time. Still, the symptoms are
recognized as falling into several principal categories. 62  One of
these is "hyperarousal," a physiological response in which the cen-
tral nervous system puts the body constantly on alert for more dan-
ger.63 Another is "intrusion," in which the victim constantly relives
the traumatic event. 64 Still another is "constriction" or the almost
trance-like state of dissociation. 65 In this state, according to psychia-
trist Abram Kardiner, whose early work on combat-induced trauma
is still relevant today, a trauma victim is almost literally unable to
pursue any purposeful activity.66 Dr. Judith Herman, the author of a
leading book on trauma, describes a "dialectic of trauma," noting
that victims oscillate back and forth between these opposing psycho-
logical states during their efforts to come to grips with their trau-
matic events.
67
Most people who are affected by traumatic events will recover
without suffering illness. Some will develop PTSD, a recognized
psychiatric disorder that, like obsessive-compulsive disorder or panic
disorder, is phenomenonological in nature. 68 The DSM-IV states
that a person who experiences PTSD must have one or more symp-
toms from each of the following three different categories: (1) reliv-
ing the traumatic event through upsetting thoughts, nightmares or
flashbacks; (2) purposely avoiding activities that remind one of the
trauma; and (3) experiencing chronic hyperarousal. 69 This classifi-
cation as phenomenonological in nature indicates such behavior
bears a resemblance to normal human behavior, 70 and thus can be
difficult to attribute to the traumatic event instead of to pre-existing
60. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 31.
61. Id. at 58.
62. Id. at 35.
63. Id. at 35-37.
64. Id. at 37-42.
65. Id. at 42-47.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id. at 47.
68. van der Kolk & McFarlane, supra note 36, at 4-5.
69. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 41.
70. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 15; HERMAN, supra note 13, at 49.
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conditions.7' Such misdiagnosis produces "costly errors" due to the
failure to recognize treatable post-traumatic stress disorders. 72 An-
other source of confusion is that people may possess some of the
described symptoms, but lack the aggregate accumulation that
causes the contemporary recognition of PTSD.73 Still another prob-
lem is that some will have symptoms that immediately yield PTSD,
while in others onset may be delayed for weeks or months.
74
Who shall suffer from PTSD depends on a wide range of risk fac-
tors. The DSM-IV applies a classic dose-response relationship to
this problem.75 The closer one is to the traumatic stressor, the
greater the likelihood of severe effects.76 The severity and duration
of the traumatic event are also important in predicting whether one
will experience PTSD.77 There have been considerable disagree-
ments over the extent to which certain people are predisposed to ex-
perience PTSD by virtue of their "family history, childhood experi-
ences, personality variables, and preexisting mental disorders. 78
This suggests imposing blame on the victim, which has been an un-
fortunate aspect of this research going back to the age of hysteria.79
71. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 15.
72. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 49.
73. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 32, at 7-8.
74. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 180-81.
75. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 41. See also ALLEN, su-
pra note 38, at 13; HERMAN, supra note 13, at 57 (noting that the
greater the exposure the more likely that people experience PTSD,
citing studies of rape survivors and kidnaps).
76. For example, witnessing the death of a friend in combat or a
loved one in natural disaster creates a high risk for PTSD. HERMAN,
supra note 13, at 54.
77. AM. PSCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 41.
78. See Anne M. Dietrich, Risk Factors in PTSD and Related
Disorders: Theoretical, Treatment, and Research Implications, 7
TRAUMATOLOGY No. 1 at 27 (2001), available at http://www.fsu.
edu/-trauma/v7/RiskFactorsfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
79. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 116-17. Herman notes that the
tendency to blame the victim still predominates in "conceptual er-
rors" in research, citing examples of research regarding supposed
personality defects that predispose a woman to abuse by her spouse,
and a recent study of emergency room personnel describing battered
women as "crocks." Id.
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A promising focus of research seeking knowledge of the biochemi-
cal workings of the brain and the connection to the individual human
experience of trauma continues forward with already dispositive re-
suits. 8° This work, like that attempting to discern biochemical
causes for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), is not,
however, without controversy.
3. The Recovery Process and Treatment Options
Those affected by traumatic events must understand that the recov-
ery process is a necessary component of resolving the issue that im-
pacted their lives. The principal stages of recovery are fairly
widely recognized.83 The central idea of recovery is "to restore
power and control to the survivor.' 84 First and foremost, one fo-
cuses on restoring the trauma victim's connections with society
80. Schore, supra note 55 (proposing thai early child abuse im-
prints the right brain and makes structural changes that predispose
that person to PTSD); see also ROTHSCHILD, supra note 32, at 9 (de-
scribing Rachel Yehuda's work relating a deficiency in cortisol pro-
duction by the adrenal glands to PTSD).
81. See, e.g., RICHARD DEGRANDPRE, RITALIN NATION: RAPID-
FIRE CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN
CONSCIOUSNESS 38-41 (1999) (sharply criticizing any attempt to
find a biological mechanism to explain ADHD). Like PTSD,
ADHD is a defined mental disorder in the DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS. Id. at 38; see AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 41. Interestingly, some studies find
a high degree of comorbidity (confluence) of ADHD and PTSD.
Alexander C. McFarlane & Bessel A. van der Kolk, Trauma and Its
Challenge to Society, in van der Kolk et al., TRAUMATIC STRESS,
supra note 35, at 24, 31 [hereinafter McFarlane & van der Kolk,
Trauma and Society]. If the biochemical "causes" of ADHD were
undermined, these links would probably also have to be called into
question.
82. HERMAN, supra note 13.
83. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 155 ("[tjhe same basic concept of
recovery stages has emerged repeatedly, from Janet's classic work
on hysteria to recent descriptions of work with combat trauma, dis-
sociative disorders, and multiple personality disorder.").
84. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 159.
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through a process that has three basic steps.85 In the first stage, we
allow the victim to establish a sense of safety. This can be difficult
if the traumatic event threatens to recur (as in the case of spousal
rape), and that difficulty can be compounded by the isolation from
86
society that victims often feel. The popular notion is that prompt
action in the pursuit of restoring safety, such as crisis intervention,
can restore people to normal,87 however Dr. Herman cautions that
even when this appears to be true it may take more for healing to
occur. 88 After basic safety is established, the trauma victim still
needs to recognize and process the traumatic experience, often by
way of sharing it with others.89 Finally, the survivor reconnects with
external society.90 The recovery process is not as cleanly delineated
85. Alexander C. McFarlane & Rachel Yehuda, Resilience, Vul-
nerability, and the Course of Posttraumatic Reactions, in
TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE
ON MIND, BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 35, at 155, 157.
86. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 62.
87. However, it is hardly clear that all such immediate actions are
productive. Two recent studies challenge the use of "debriefing"
(counseling sessions given to survivors immediately after disasters)
for those affected by 9/11. See Shankar Vedantam, Two Studies
Raise Doubts on Trauma Counseling's Value, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2002, at A12. The technique "consists of individual or group ses-
sions lasting one to three hours where survivors describe what they
have been through and talk about their feelings." Id. A government-
funded study of 9/11 survivors found that debriefing is often coun-
terproductive because it runs the risk of creating additional distress.
Id. As the article makes clear, "[n]o one knows how long clinicians
should wait after a traumatic event to evaluate individuals to see
whether they are getting better on their own." Id. This is just one
more example of the difficulties we face in grappling with these
events. Id.
88. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 165 ("Though the survivor may
make a rapid and direct return to the appearance of normal function-
ing, this symptomatic stabilization should not be mistaken for full
recovery, for the integration of the trauma has not been accom-
plished.").
89. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 237 ("The universal prescription for
trauma: Talk about it.").
90. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 3.
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as it appears from this brief description. Most importantly, the
stages are not discrete; nothing is linear when responding to trauma.
Recovery can occur sporadically and over a lengthy period of time.
Numerous studies recognize that "backsliding" can occur along the
way.91
Consistent with this perspective towards the nature of trauma,
there is a wide range of treatment options ranging from none at all
(completely self-directed recovery, or, in trauma lingo, "coping"92)
to active professional intervention. 93 Even in a nation with many
opportunities for therapy, where there is seemingly a fix for every-
thing, not everyone who watched television on 9/11 is a candidate
for professional help or a pill. Not everyone will suffer from PTSD.
Some will recover quickly whereas others will not. The "[a]ctive,
task-oriented person" might find success with his trauma by the cop-. 4 94
ing modality. Others will require therapy, medication,95 behavioral
or cognitive techniques, 96 and well-known social strategies, such as
91. See Lagnado, supra note 11.
92. See Arieh Shalev, supra note 42, at 89; ALLEN, supra note 38,
at 262 ("Many people can cope with trauma without any treat-
ment.").
93. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 239-46 (describing the benefits of
individual psychotherapy in treatment); HERMAN, supra note 13, at
156.
94. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 58. A study of men who suffered
heart attacks suggests that even "social support in the absence of an
internal locus of control may in fact impair healing processes." Id.;
McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and Its Challenge to Society,
supra note 81, at 24, 29.
95. The class of antidepressants known as "SSRIs" (selective se-
rotonin reuptake inhibitors), including such widely known drugs as
Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft, is widely used in the treatment of PTSD.
See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 258.
96. One interesting approach among the many available is "eye
movement desensitization reprocessing" (EMDR), in which patients
are asked to follow the therapist's finger with their eyes while con-
centrating on the traumatic event. The investigator responsible for
the development of EMDR reports that it is highly effective in de-
sensitizing patients' traumatic memories. See Francine Shapiro, Ef-
ficacy of the Eye Movement Desensitization Procedure in the Treat-
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reliance on self-help organizations and the justice system.97 Treat-
ment needs to be carefully monitored to make sure it is appropriate
to the survivor's progress in the recovery process. One should note
that an action or treatment modality adopted at one point in time may
not be the best form of treatment at another.
98
B. We Are Not Yet "Over" 9/11
Some would argue that the above discussion is moot regarding
9/11 because most of us can cope easily and have already done so.
The nation does appear to be returning to some sense of normal. The
Fourth of July, the World Series and the Super Bowl came and went
without incident. Over the course of the past year, Iraq, Enron,
WorldCom, and the successful return of Elizabeth Smart dominated
the news. There seems to be a prevalent belief - or perhaps hope -
that time and the absence of additional successful terrorist attacks
have gone a long way toward healing the national wound.
1. Talking Heads Can't Get Trauma "Right"
There is a widespread belief that post-traumatic stress affected
only those present on 9/11 in New York or Washington (victims and
rescue workers, for example),99 or those with family members or
business acquaintances in those areas, and not the populace of a
country. We want to believe that the symptoms and disorders asso-
ciated with trauma happen to other people, and that we are a nation
that recovers quickly from adversity. Any focus on trauma would
also seem to run contrary to our stance against terrorists, shining the
ment of Traumatic Memories, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, supra note 45, at 432, 432.
97. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 160.
98. van der Kolk et al., Treatment Approaches, supra note 31
("Trauma needs to be treated differently at different phases of peo-
ple's lives following the trauma, and at the different stages of the
disorder PTSD. Treatments that may be effective at some stages
might not be effective at others.").
99. For a description of the significant impacts on people present
at "Ground Zero," see Julie Knop, Ground Zero: Almost, 7
TRAUMATOLOGY No. 4 (2001), available at http://www.fsu.edu/-
trauma/v7/GroundZeroAlmost.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
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light on ourselves and perpetuating a notion of victimhood; 100 it is
apparently much more satisfying to go get revenge on Osama bin
Laden than to engage in introspection. There is more at work here
than a lack of information; avoidance, repression, and denial are
common responses to trauma. 01  The reductive presentation of
trauma and 9/11 in the popular press exacerbates these reactions,
preventing effective understanding of the issue. According to pub-
lished reports, about 10% of those in the cities that were attacked
will develop PTSD after 9/11.102 The few empirical studies com-
pleted in the past year tend to show that adults and children in New
York and Washington are still affected;' 03 the rest of us can suppos-
edly go about our business.
This business of adopting shortcuts to explain the trauma of 9/11 is
clearly intended to offer a measure of comfort to a beleaguered pub-
lic. However, it is meaningless to reduce trauma to numbers in this
100. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 17 (because most people do get over
their traumatic experiences, "[w]e like to think of 'survivors,' not
'victims."').
101. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 32; ALLEN, supra note 38, at 3
("Avoidance is such a common reaction that it's a defining feature of
posttraumatic stress disorder.").
102. See, e.g., Garret Condon, Vague Terror Alerts Called Hurtful,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 22, 2002, at B 1 (citing comments by Dr.
Charles A. Morgan III, associate professor of psychiatry at the Yale
University School of Medicine and associate director of the post-
traumatic stress disorder program at the VA Connecticut Healthcare
System, that "he expects that the rate of PTSD from [9/11] will be
comparable to the rates among war veterans: 8 percent to 12 percent
among Vietnam War vets, and about 8 percent among those who
fought in the Gulf War."). Dr. Morgan admits, however, that "it's
impossible to say what the lasting psychological impact of Sept. 11
will be, although a number of studies are underway." Id. See also
Markels, supra note 15, at 71 (citing the 8 percent figure).
103. A study released in May 2002, conducted by a research team
from the Columbia University School of Public Health and Applied
Research & Consulting LLC, concludes that "[m]ore than a fourth
of New York City schoolchildren are suffering from at least one
trauma-related disorder such as anxiety and agoraphobia." Christine
Haughney, N.Y. Students Still Distressed From Sept. 11, WASH.
POST, May 2, 2002, at A6.
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fashion.104 Even if it were defensible, the unique nature of 9/11
guarantees that these numbers are unreliable. One research team
posits that the number of people who are clinically ill as a result of
traumatic events could be much larger than any previous studies
could predict, given the prevalence of "subthreshold PTSD."'' 0 5 This
diagnosis would apply to people who have suffered as a result of
9/11 but fall short of having enough symptoms to warrant a clinical
diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV definition.' 
06
As a result, it follows that the definition of PTSD itself may be in-
sufficient for issues related to 9/11, implying we do not have a suffi-
cient comprehension of the situation. Experts caution that using
such a label to explain the various reactions to traumatic events may
be outdated, as there may be a continuum of disorders instead of
one. 0 7 The field trials leading to the groundbreaking recognition of
PTSD focused on patients with a limited number of post-traumatic
conditions, namely combat, disaster, and rape.' °8 Terror is different
because of its randomness predicated on the terrorists' promises to
strike anywhere, at any time, with little or no warning.' 09 This is an
104. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 34 ("[s]implistic efforts to quantify
trauma ultimately lead to meaningless comparisons of horror.").
105. See Randall D. Marshall et al., Comorbidity, Impairment, and
Suicidality in Subthreshold PTSD, 158 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY No. 9,
at 1467 (2001).
106. Id.
107. See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 119-20.
108. "They [diagnostic criteria for PTSD] are based on the proto-
types of combat, disaster, and rape." HERMAN, supra note 13, at 119.
See also Alexander C. McFarlane & Giovanni de Girolamo, The Na-
ture of Traumatic Stressors and the Epidemiology of Posttraumatic
Reactions, in TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING
EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 49, at 129,
137 (field trials for DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS were based on individuals "who had experi-
enced a limited range of traumatic experiences").
109. See, e.g., Jessica Hamblen, What are the Traumatic Stress
Effects of Terrorism?, Natl. Ctr. for PTSD, at http://ncptsd.org/
facts/disasters/fsterrorism.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) ("Terror-
ism erodes-at both the individual level and the community level-
the sense of security and safety people usually feel. Terrorism chal-
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important element of the terrorist's strategy, and thus introduces a
new dimension to our thinking about trauma; a dimension that those
who have studied Vietnam veterans, for instance, never faced.
Dr. Judith Herman points out another problem with the DSM-IV
definition of PTSD. She notes that development was based on "cir-
cumscribed traumatic events," not those occurring over a length of
time, it cannot accurately account for prolonged traumatic events,
such as repeated spousal abuse - or terror.' She proposes the rec-
ognition of a syndrome to be called "complex post-traumatic stress
disorder." Using this logic for 9/11, the current definition of PTSD
is inadequate for conditions involving terror events plus warnings of
terror over a protracted amount of time.'11
More problems exist. Due to the unique nature of 9/11 in our his-
tory; we have no experience with the psychological effects of this
type of traumatic event. 112 Other major conflicts took place else-
where. It is of note that the last time a foreign power invaded the
sanctity of our Capitol was during the War of 1812; the pioneers of
trauma research were not born until more than fifty years later.
9/1 I's ubiquity exacerbates the problem. Virtually every American
experienced 9/11 through the media. The sight of the White House
burning in 1814 may have been terrifying for those on the scene, but
it was not broadcast live on national television. What impacts were
felt by those transfixed to CNN's coverage of the planes slamming
into the World Trade Center? We cannot know for sure."3 While
lenges the natural need of humans to see the world as predictable,
orderly, and controllable.").
110. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 119; van der Kolk et al., History of
Trauma in Psychiatry, supra note 49, at 61-62 (noting that the basis
for inclusion of PTSD in the third edition of DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS was studies on war
and rape that were done in the 1970s).
111. See Jamie Talan, The Danger In Frequent Danger Warnings,
NEWSDAY, June 4, 2002, at DOI (noting that the impact of repeated
warnings is not well understood); Condon, supra note 103.
112. See Hamblen, supra note 110 ("Fortunately, there have been
very few terrorist attacks in the United States. One consequence of
this, however, is that there has been little research about how people
are affected by terrorism.").
113. See Shankar Vedantam, After Sept. 11, Psychic Wounds Slow
to Heal, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at A3 ("What psychological
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some have studied adults and children in New York and Washing-
ton, few seem curious about what those in Kansas City or Peoria are
feeling. We posit that someone who personally watched a body fal-
ling from a burning tower must be more at risk for symptoms of
post-traumatic stress than someone who watched that same event on
television, but beyond such comparison it gets difficult to say who is
affected and by how much.'1 4 The element of surprise inherent in
terrorist attacks could increase the likelihood that even those watch-
ing on television were seriously affected." 
5
2. We May Not Be Back to Normal (Even If it Looks Like It)
Conventional wisdom may say that 9/11 changed everything for a
short time and then life went on, more or less, as before.' 6 Yet ex-
scars, for example, were suffered by Americans who watched hor-
rific images over and over on TV, and felt personally attacked?").
See generally Jessica Hamblen, How the Community May Be Af-
fected by Media Coverage of the Terrorist Attack, at
http://www.ncptsd.org/facts/disasters/fsmediadisaster.html (last
viewed Oct. 31, 2003) (citing conflicting studies regarding the im-
pact of watching television on increases in PTSD symptoms and
concluding that "[a]lthough there is little research" on the subject,
"too much trauma-related television viewing may have a negative
impact, especially on children").
114. See, e.g., Markels, supra note 15, at 71 ("As yet, though, it's
unclear whether [the people who get PTSD as a result of the attacks]
will turn out to be 8 percent of the tens of thousands of rescue work-
ers and victims' relatives, or of the tens of millions who experienced
the trauma via TV and the event's social and economic aftermath.").
115. See Hanna Rosin, 9-11 Changed Everything. For a Little
While, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2002, at C1 ("Most research in post-
traumatic stress so far has examined direct victims of catastrophe,
their families or rescue workers. But in an age of terrorism and 24-
hour news, researchers have begun to study the more oblique symp-
toms that show up months later in people who do nothing more than
watch.").
116. One observer notes wryly, "McDonald's is still frying up Big
Macs and Calvin Klein is still dreaming up evening dresses." Walter
Kim, Notes on the Darkest Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at 7 (re-
viewing a number of post-9/1 1 books).
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perts tell us that well after a traumatic event, the trauma may remain
unresolved.117 At the Fordham Environmental Law Journal's sym-
posium entitled "Terror in the Air", there were sharp, pointed ex-
changes about the cleanup of lower Manhattan and the alleged mal-
feasance of governmental officials. Anyone who heard the outbursts
of raw emotion from angry residents did not have to be a clinical
psychologist to note that those closest to Ground Zero are still suf-
fering. 18 Those at a distance may have since resumed fully func-
tional lives, yet harbor a fear of further terror attacks. In this envi-
ronment, who is to say what is to follow in the coming months?
There is also a simple temporal problem. New warnings come all
the time, no one can theorize when the war on terror will end." 9
Thus it is counterintuitive to assume most people are "over" 9/11.
Even the secondary evidence that convinces some that America is
returning to "normal" (for example, such a belief based on rebound-
ing travel rates) 12 does not uniformly indicate a return to pre-9/11
levels and in fact shows that some behavior has been changed in sig-
nificant ways. 12 1 In sum, the relationship between trauma and 9/11
117. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 165 ("Though the survivor may
make a rapid and direct return to the appearance of normal function-
ing, this symptomatic stabilization should not be mistaken for full
recovery, for the integration of the trauma has not been accom-
plished."). An observer who reviewed a number of post-9/11 books
for the "anniversary" of 9/11 asks, "Can the books help us move on?
It feels too soon for that." Kirn, supra note 117, at 7.
118. Still, it helps to have some confirmation. One observer noted
that well after 9/11 there was another wave of people requesting
psychological help for lingering effects. See Lagnado, supra note 11.
119. Michael Kilian, Global Anti-terrorism Efforts Can't Slack Off,
Senators Told, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2002, at 3 (discussing ongoing
threat posed by al-Qaeda and the arrest of the "dirty bomb" suspect);
James P. Pinkerton, Militarism's Lethal Logic, L.A. TIMES, May 10,
2002, at B15 (citing the prediction by investment expert Warren
Buffett that it is "virtually a certainty" that "terrorists will inflict 'a
major nuclear event' on the United States sometime soon").
120. See, e.g., Michael Cabanatuan, Travelers Defy Threats, Take
to Skies For Holiday, S.F. CHRON., May 23, 2002, at Al.
121. Id. (stating "...all is not back to normal. Airlines are still fly-
ing fewer flights, and hotel occupancy rates in most tourist destina-
tions - including San Francisco - remain down."). Some interesting
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is complex and not reducible to decisions to book hotel rooms. The
unspoken assumption that if as many people take a hotel room as
before we are "cured" does not account for those whose lives have
changed after 9/11 and those who still fear a terrorist attack.
One might expect that it would be relatively straightforward to
predict who may still be affected. Such ease of analysis, if expected,
is unfounded. Beyond the simple uniqueness of 9/11, there are
plenty of reasons for the dearth of good information. As a result of
the recent development conceptualizing trauma as within the realm
of normal human experience, we have little practice with viewing it
as something that can affect large groups of people in diverse ways.
There are also complex logistical difficulties inherent in mounting a
longitudinal study that would evaluate rescue workers from Pitts-
burgh, television viewers in Kansas City and children in New York
schools. 122  One does not poll people for quick answers about
trauma; such research will take concerted effort by researchers over
a lengthy period of time.
Not surprisingly, then, if one goes looking for a comprehensive
study of how large groups of people respond to terror, few good
models are at hand. American researchers have studied disasters in
some detail, 123 but a natural disaster does not compare to a manmade
evidence that Americans have changed their travel habits, albeit
mostly anecdotal in nature, can be found in the increasing allure of
domestic vacations. In mid-2002, for example, one writer posited a
link between terrorism and a surge in RV usage. Nicholas D. Kris-
tof, When Home Got 10 Miles A Gallon, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002,
§ 5, at 10 (noting that the reasons for increased RV usage "presuma-
bly include a reluctance to fly and a preference for old-fashioned
family vacations in remote places with mosquitoes and bears, but no
terrorists").
122. See, e.g., John B. Reid, A Role for Prospective Longitudinal
Investigations in the Study of Traumatic Stress and Disasters, at
http://www.trauma-pages.com/reid90.htm (last viewed Oct. 31,
2003) (describing some of the difficulties in longitudinal studies of
trauma victims, including biases).
123. See Fran H. Norris et al., 50,000 Disaster Victims Speak: An
Empirical Review of the Empirical Literature 1981-2001, Natl. Ctr.
for PTSD and Center for Mental Health Services, at
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/Activities/91 1/disaster-impact.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2003).
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terrorist attack. There is some reliable information available about
the Oklahoma City bombing that suggests a high rate of PTSD in
rescuers and survivors.' 24 The other model of a situation comparable
to 9/11 - an attack plus the threat of future harm - is found in the
detailed studies of the Israeli reaction to terror.' 25 Yet even these
studies can be readily distinguished from the 9/11 experience. Is-
raelis live in a country much smaller than our own, surrounded by
hostile states harboring terrorists. The threat of terrorism has been
pervasive and omnipresent dating to the country's founding in 1948.
The current state of research on trauma and recovery is marked
with opacity when applied to 9/11. Given that the collection of raw
data, showing how most of us recovered within a period of months
after 9/11, come from this research, they give us little confidence.
We are not "over" 9/11 yet; the psychological effects of that wound
require a lot more attention than simple statistics can offer. Even if
we assume only 10% of those in our two largest metropolitan areas
were stricken with PTSD, such would be a major mental health con-
cern.
II. A MODEL OF POST-TRAUMATIC SOCIETAL ADAPTATION
We must acknowledge that the psychological effects of 9/11 could
well be more wide-ranging than previously perceived, and may lead
to changes previously unforeseen. Not all of these changes will be
constructive, and not all will have a relationship to the legal system.
Many trauma survivors are not interested in reconnecting with exter-
nal society, and we can expect that some will withdraw from the
world around them and engage in wholly private pursuits.' 6 Yet
others will attempt to bring about change by turning to social ac-
tion. 1
27
124. See Vedantam, supra note 114, at A3 (citing a study finding a
34% rate of PTSD among rescuers and survivors).
125. See Koopman, supra note 9, at 841 (citing studies); Shalev,
supra note 42, at 84 (citing his own study of 15 terror victims).
126. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 207 ("Most survivors seek the
resolution of their traumatic experience within the confines of their
personal lives.").
127. Obviously, not all victims set aside destructive forces, and it
might be interesting to speculate on how that problem might resolve
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Traumatic events can be "catalyst[s] for social change,"' 128 but the
mechanism by which this occurs has not been made clear. There are
many reasons for such a state of affairs. Trauma study is a recent
phenomenon, but impacts causing change have happened for centu-
ries without any recognition of traumatic effects. 29 Change can
happen under circumstances that make it difficult to recognize the
effects of trauma (for example, official denials of traumatic
events). 13 It is also apparent that not all social change after an event
such as 9/11 is the result of the introspection demanded by the re-
covery process. Still, one should note the widely held notion that
many trauma survivors have been active and successful advocates
for change.1 ' They have, in the words of one expert, "been able to
itself in the context of 9/11. Certainly one could imagine without
too much difficulty a criminal trial with a defense related to post-
traumatic stress.
128. McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and Society, supra note
81, at 33. See also HERMAN, supra note 13, at 208; Paul Kennedy,
Maintaining American Power: From Injury to Recovery, in THE AGE
OF TERROR, supra note 16, at 53, 57 ("History is replete with exam-
ples of well-established nations that received a staggering blow but
then scrambled to recover from the wound.").
129. McFarlane and van der Kolk offer the examples of the Mar-
shall Plan, GI Bill, and Veterans Administration construction, all of
which were done without attention to psychology and its meaning
for a recovering nation; in the case of VA construction, for example,
"with all this thoughtful attention to the returning veteran, no atten-
tion was paid to the psychological scars of war." McFarlane & van
der Kolk, Trauma and Society, supra note 81, at 34.
130. An example of this is political recognition of the Holocaust.
Even research on its psychological consequences "was initiated
slowly because of a social climate of denial." Koopman, supra note
9, at 838. Yet another example is that of repressive societies where
torture and other brutal behavior sponsored by governments are of
course frequently accompanied by denial. See, e.g., McFarlane and
van der Kolk, Trauma and Society, supra note 81, at 40-41. Even in
these repressive societies it is possible for change to take place. Id.,
at 41 ("Somehow, it is possible for societies to make a transition
from cycles of victimization and revenge.").
131. McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and Society, supra note
81, at 33.
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transform their trauma into a way of helping other people."' 32 Those
most successful at this strike a delicate balance between excessive
reliving of the traumatic events and capitulation to a societal failure
to recognize the trauma and ameliorate its effects.' 
33
Leading authorities on trauma recognize the potential for advo-
cacy, but offer few definitive statements about how advocates trans-
form suffering into social change. In response, I offer an approach I
will term "post-traumatic societal adaptation" (PTSA). This ap-
proach, with appropriate caveats and qualifications, is intended to
offer guidance about what may become "normal" after 9/11. I have
mimicked the term "post-traumatic stress disorder" quite deliber-
ately, to signal to those largely unfamiliar with this field (but who
may know of the disorder) that the process of social change relates,
in a fundamental way, to trauma and recovery. I use the term "adap-
tation" to recognize the pervasiveness of post-traumatic stress and
the full range of adaptive behavior likely to be required of trauma
survivors. 34 In some respects, I also echo the work of those scholars
who have looked to science and mathematics for ideas about legal
change that represent a more holistic (or "adaptive") approach to
how we respond to our environment.1 3
5
There is no one way that people respond to trauma, there are rela-
tively few hard specifics, and many areas exist where rigorous em-
pirical testing yet have not been studied. Taking these factors into
account yields this to be potentially a more satisfying model than
any other at hand to explain how human beings will continue to re-
spond to 9/11, but it should not be mistaken for a justification for
law that substitutes scientific principles for Western political phi-
losophy; that would be entirely unsatisfactory. Trauma and recovery
may be an important factor in steering the course of the republic over
the next decades, but any specific laws that emerge should still be
132. Id.; see also HERMAN, supra note 13, at 208.
133. McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and Society, supra note
81, at 34.
134. McFarlane and van der Kolk state, "[i]n order to move beyond
trauma, people, institutions and societies need to take adaptive ac-
tion." Id.
135. For a fascinating commentary on this link between science
and public policy, see STEVEN VOGEL, PRIME MOVER: A NATURAL
HISTORY OF MUSCLE ix (2001) ("[a] biologically based view can
shed light on our human world.").
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judged against traditional political and economic criteria. 3 6 Survi-
vors can and will encounter opposition to their claims. Proposals for
compensation for 9/11 victims were debated and approved rather
swiftly. 37 Going beyond that may prove problematic, as it has often
been difficult in the political sphere to validate the empowerment of
recovered victims. 13 When rape victims spoke out about not only
rape laws but also more generally the unequal treatment of women,
we saw resistance in the legislative and judicial systems to that pres-
sure.
A. The Model: "Adaptive Resources," "Early Adapters," "Pattern
Markers," and the "Survivor Mission "
1. Early Adapters and the Survivor Mission
I will begin by identifying the advocates introduced above. If the
aftermath of 9/11 resembles past situations involving traumatic
events, those with the strongest predisposition to social action, as a
logical extension of their recovery process, should find themselves in
a vanguard. 139 Those pioneers will assess the existing system and
apply themselves to changing the legal structure. For example, they
136. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 47-60 (1990) (describing
statutes as products of forces such as market failure and attempts to
trade off private preferences).
137. See Lena H. Sun &Jacqueline L. Salmon, U.S. Sets Formula
to Pay Victims; Sept. 11 Families Average $1.6 Million, WASH.
POST, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al (describing the rules of the Sept. 11 Vic-
tims Compensation Fund approved in the airline bailout legislation).
Unfortunately, the fund is not without its challenges. See Lena H.
Sun & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Sept. 11 Families Fight Fund Rules;
Relatives Call Federal Compensation Stingy, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,
2002, at B 1.
138. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 211 ("The survivor who under-
takes public action needs to come to terms with the fact that not
every battle will be won.").
139. Id., at 207-08 (describing the forcefulness of survivors who
"transcend" traumatic events by establishing a "connection with the
best in other people"); McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and So-
ciety, supra note 81, at 33.
2003]
532 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
may work to reverse laws that embody societal assumptions that put
them at risk of becoming victims again. There are already formal
9/11 survivor groups that have dedicated themselves in part to legal
change. Whether they will be the most successful advocates for
change remains to be seen; however their mere existence suggests
the importance for some survivors to become involved in the politi-
cal process. 40 Dr. Herman uses the term "survivor mission" to de-
scribe the agenda developed by these early advocates, and I will do
so as well.1
41
These pioneers enjoy a sort of prominence in history. They are
credited with the strength of personal commitment and perseverance
that makes change possible. 142 The literature does not always use
the language of psychology, as it could, but often makes clear that
there is a direct link between their traumatic experiences and their
commitments to improving the lot of others. It is probable,
though it requires evaluation, that these people would have a very
substantial impact on the course of any law that bears a relationship
140. The New York Environmental Law and Justice Project has
been an active advocate for "awareness of the eruption of dangers to
our environment that we now face since 9-11, plans for a major
cleanup, and ... actions to rectify these situations." See New York
Environmental Law and Justice Project, WTC Page, at
http://www.nyenvirolaw.org/wtc-index.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2003). See also Susan Levine, A Mission of Remembrance; Rela-
tives of Sept. 11 Victims Turn Grief Into Political Action on Array of
Issues, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at BI ("It [9/11] also is giving
rise to grief as a political force. At least five groups have formed,
including the Families of September 11 and Pentagon Angels here
and three others in New York."). A vivid description of the impact
of the attacks on the New York legal community, and the response
from lawyers interested in pro bono efforts, is found in Matthew
Wilkes, Teaching Through Tragedy: The Aftermath of September 11
- A Community Service Response, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 205
(2002).
141. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 207; see also ALLEN, supra note
38, at 309 (quoting Dr. Herman and placing her comments about the
''survivor mission" in the context of a desire to help others).
142. McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and Society, supra note
81, at 33.
143. See, e.g., id.
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to trauma and 9/11. It may be hypothesized that they will develop
alliances that will prove useful in advancing their agenda, so it is
incorrect to assume they would act alone. 144 Still, we are so accus-
tomed to recognizing the importance of those who speak out force-
fully about legal and political issues that I will term them "early
adapters" to reflect their prominence in post-recovery dynamics.
The fact that 9/11 happened to everyone does not necessarily make
everyone an early adapter; that term fits only those who have be-
come motivated to press for change as a result of their own dealings
with 9/11.
2. Adaptive Resources
As we think about the legal change likely to be spurred by early
adapters, we should be sure to examine the role of certain values,
developed during the recovery process, as motivational forces. The
recovery process is all about the development of a new self, different
in fundamental ways from the old. 145 For many survivors of trauma,
a variety of elements of the self can arise or, if already in existence,
be honed during the recovery process. Survivors have come to ap-
preciate capabilities they developed during the process (for example,
mental skills that allowed for better processing of unpleasant memo-
ries) and features of their renewed connections with society (such as
new support networks). 146 It is an understanding of these new ele-
ments of their lives that drives some survivors to change the world
144. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 210 (noting that the choice to
speak out about social ills increases the potential for finding allies).
145. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 202 ("Her [the trauma survivor's]
task now is to become the person she wants to be. In the process she
draws upon those aspects of herself that she most values from the
time before the trauma, from the experience of the trauma itself, and
from the period of recovery. Integrating all of these elements, she
creates a new self, both ideally and in actuality.").
146. An empirical study of rape victims, 15-30 months after their
rapes, found that notwithstanding the fact that rape is a "highly
stressful experience," the evidence "reinforces the view that for
many people stressful life events can be growth promoting and foster
maturation." Carol C. Nadelson et al., A Follow-Up Study of Rape
Victims, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON POSTIRAUMATIC STRESS, supra
note 45 at 161, 167-68.
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around them, helping others achieve the same or similar goals. 47 As
we shall soon see, not all of these elements of the new self lead to a
preference for social action, but we can attempt to link those that do
to the type of change that survivors might demand. We see this in
describing why recovered trauma victims do not simply focus on
their own predicament. If the recovered rape victim pushes for
stronger rape laws because that would prevent others from being
raped, we can conclude that the survivor's understanding of her new-
found sense of safety may have played a part in the formation of her
advocacy.
Borrowing from Dr. Herman, I use the term "adaptive resources"
as a shorthand description of both the means deployed to enable the
victim to survive and recover from trauma and the characteristics of
the new self developed during that process.' 48 These adaptive re-
sources are aspects of the recovery process that frequently lead a
recovered victim to a new lifelong personal agenda. The interaction
with others during the latter stages of recovery, for example, can
stimulate a new way of entering into and fostering of interpersonal
relationships.' 49 Many adaptive resources are significant markers of
personal growth and development, but present no real necessity for
any legal change. If one has become more confident speaking in
front of groups as a result of recovery, such may be a laudable de-
velopment, but presents no basis for legal change. The opposite is
also true: it is often possible that some existing laws might come into
conflict with adaptive resources developed by early adapters after a
dislocation. The trauma survivor's evaluation of whether legal
change is necessary builds upon the adaptive resources she devel-
oped in the crucible of the recovery process.
What are the expected adaptive resources and survivor's mission
after a traumatic event has occurred? For survivors, the process of
overcoming fear and replacing it with empowerment requires a vari-
ety of skills.' 50 One of the most basic is doing whatever necessary to
survive the immediate impact of the stressor. Psychologists often
147. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 207-11.
148. Id. at 204.
149. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 38, at 163-65.
150. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 204.
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refer to this by the shorthand of "fight or flight,"' 5 1 to represent the
fact that not all victims choose to resist. One who has come to grips
with trauma, in part by identifying and bolstering this skill, may later
advocate concrete measures to protect the self and others against
future danger; for example, a rape victim who seeks to prevent future
similar attacks could focus on the promulgation of new rape laws. 152
This push for safety would hardly be limited to action aimed at pun-
ishing acts of aggression because survivors may also focus on help-
ing others avoid similar traumatic experiences. 153 In the case of
rape, it would include action taken to eliminate societal precondi-
tions that make rape possible; for example, if there were no pornog-
raphy the objectification of women, thus delimited, would preclude
the potential for characterization as "sex objects."' 154 Other advo-
cates work to eliminate barriers to overcoming fear that prolong the
reliving of the traumatic event: if, for example, the law did not allow
the defense to probe a woman's conduct before her alleged attack,
then rape victims could have less fear of taking the witness stand. 55
The survivor mission is typically even more adventurous because
the common characteristic of all social action efforts by survivors is
that they seek to raise awareness of the traumatic event and its wide-
ranging effects. 156 Once again, a comparison to rape victims is in
order. No one would seriously argue that rape survivors should be
limited to pressing for changes in rape laws, because that would be
inconsistent with the survivors' desire to challenge entrenched be-
liefs about the full panoply of societal assumptions that cast women
151. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 29-30; see also Garcia-Rill &
Beecher-Monas, supra note 35, at 12-14 (describing the physiology
of the "fight or flight" response).
152. See generally Estrich, supra note 44.
153. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 208.
154. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND LAW 127-205 (1987).
155. See Estrich, supra note 44, at 1093. These so-called "rape
shield laws" are not without their controversy. See Shawn J. Wal-
lach, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the Expense of the
Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 13 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUMAN RTS.
485 (1997); David Haxton, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional De-
spite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 WiS. L. REV.
1219 (1997).
156. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 208.
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in a subordinate role. Indeed, one thread running through the advo-
cacy efforts of rape survivors over the years is the desire to make
conditions better for all women.' 57 It may well be that a survivor
will encounter more resistance when pursuing a broader reform ef-
fort, however this, one may argue, does not indicate an attempt shall
not be made.
3. The Problem of Attribution and the Role of "Pattern Markers"
Giving proper credit to the trauma and recovery process, as a
driver for change, can be difficult. This leads to a problem I will
term "attribution," which has two fundamental aspects. The first is
the challenge of identifying early adapters accurately, particularly in
the context of 9/11 where everyone has been affected to some extent.
Sometimes identification need not be difficult. For many survi-
vors, there is a need for societal support for the expression of their
voices; without that the status quo cannot be readily overcome.15 8 It
is therefore possible that some survivors of 9/11 will identify them-
selves by speaking out about their mission, much as rape survivors
have. Even if they do identify themselves, it may prove difficult to
discern the motivation for their actions. Adaptive resources can take
the form of enhancements of existing personality traits, and this can
tempt us to believe resilience is an innate quality, rather than some-
thing developed as an outcome of a careful recovery process. Still
another problem is that many who would push for change may have
records of advocacy. In the years to come, it may be argued by some
that decide that pre-existing agendas, not the impacts of 9/11, drive
some survivors to pursue social change.
157. For example, Professor Estrich may be best known for her
pioneering articles on rape, but her recent scholarship and works for
laypersons include analyses of the "gender gap" in elections (Susan
Estrich, Bridging the Gender Gap, 3 SCHOLAR 153 (2001)), women
in the workplace (SUSAN ESTRICH, SEX AND POWER (2000)), and
even women's diet and nutrition needs (SUSAN ESTRICH, MAKING
THE CASE FOR YOURSELF: A DIET BOOK FOR SMART WOMEN
(1998)).
158. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 9.
[VOL. XIV
THE TRAJECTORY OF "NORMAL" AFTER 9/11
A second attribution-related problem is deciding which survivors
have a "first mover" advantage in forcing social change.159 The uni-
versal nature of 9/11 means that virtually anyone can claim that their
advocacy agenda is a legitimate outgrowth of 9/11. The challenge is
to decide which of these people will become successful to the extent
that we would think of them as early adapters. As a result, we need
to qualify the role of adaptive resources by positing that they may
well be most relevant to the extent there are perceived widespread
similarities in the recovery process from 9/11. The individualized
nature of the recovery process means adaptive resources will not be
the same for everyone (just as not every woman responds to rape in
the same way) and these resources will change and develop over
time (the way one expresses and conducts oneself in the final stage
of the recovery process is not the same way one does later). Com-
monalities among early adapters and others who either join with
them or offer political support will be reflected in the legal system;
other resources will not.
If I have become empowered in a certain way and build upon that
to reconnect with the public sphere, but my message does not reso-
nate with anyone else, then little change is likely. The essential
characteristic is this resonance that depends on the presence of others
who support my viewpoint, whether or not they are early adapters
themselves. There are numerous reasons why the messages of one
or more survivors may fail to gain widespread acceptance. Other
survivors can perceive them as not important. Entrenched political
obstacles can stymie them. 60 Notably, opposition to one group of
survivors can arise from other survivors convinced of the merit of
their own missions. This has already been problematic in the case of
159. An excellent discussion of this dynamic and the literature on
which it is based is found in William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Envi-
ronmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. AND POL'Y REV. 1 (1997).
160. This is particularly true if survivors are part of a group disad-
vantaged by existing laws. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 137, at 63
(noting that "Psychological mechanisms of this sort [embodying a
'taste' for discrimination] furnish a formidable barrier to social
change.").
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9/11, as was evident from the protracted battles over what to build
on the remains of the fallen World Trade Center.' 61
In deciding whether a survivor's action is likely to generate suffi-
cient energy that will bring forth a critical mass of support, we must
look at whether the action is a reliable reflection of the shifts in the
preferences of others.' 62 The self-identification of a survivor and the
intensity of her argument are helpful but not necessarily conclusive
because they do not indicate that others will alter their preferences
for legal action. The principal reason why preferences change is that
the survivor's message relates to our own development of adaptive
resources. Unfortunately, we do not know what path that will take
because the reactions of large populations to traumatic events of this
sort have not been studied. So we will need what we might consider
secondary indicia: data tending to correlate with well-known re-
sponses such as "fight or flight" as an expression of avoidance
behavior of danger. Thus, data showing that videoconferencing has
increasingly replaced travel as a means of doing business 163 may be
useful to suggest how we have adjusted our behavior as a result of
9/11, and how we might as a result be amenable to legal change that
builds upon and reflects these adjustments. I will term this type of
data "pattern markers" to indicate its importance in signaling poten-
tial shifts in preferences.
161. See WTC Site Plans Receive Mixed Reaction, CBS News.com,
July 16, 2002, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/07/17/
national/main515386.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); Anna Quin-
dlen, Look at What They've Done, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 2002, at 68
(discussing and critiquing various proposals for the site).
162. That a survivor has the ability to shift the preferences of others
is unquestioned. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 137, at 40-42 (not-
ing that preferences are not fixed like economics scholars argue but
can shift).
163. See, e.g., National Business Travel Association, Business
Travel Professionals Seek to Cut Costs, Strengthen Relationships,
July 1, 2002, at http://www.nbta.org/info/pressreleases 7_ .htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2003) (providing a survey of business travel
managers, which found that 61% of travel buyers "say they will
recommend increasing the use of conference calls or webcasts").
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B. The Model in the Context of 9/1 1
What would this model imply for social change after 9/11? We
would expect advocates to begin with actions designed to protect the
victims of 9/11 and others (such as future generations) against dan-
ger. Much has already been said about modifying our strategies to
combat new terrorist attacks both at home and abroad, but there is
still room for innovation. Just as rape victims seek development
with rape laws, so too could those affected by 9/11 Push for even
stronger anti-terror laws than those already emerging. The ongo-
ing examination of strategies designed to help prevent attacks in the
first place is also likely to continue. This helps explain why there
has been extensive fingerpointing about who knew what and when
before 9/11.165 If our feckless and Byzantine governmental bureauc-
racy made it easier for terrorists to come here, stay here,' 66 and then
attack us, this must change to make subsequent attacks more diffi-
cult. Consequently, BICES (formerly the INS), the CIA and the FBI
will probably face comprehensive overhauls in the years to come. 67
164. To a certain extent, this is already taking place. See Levine,
supra note 141 at B1 (". . . several of the groups [formed after 9/11]
claim a greater purpose, realizing the power of their collective voice
to affect everything from the recovery of bodies amid the rubble of
the World Trade Center to government debate on improving airline
security and combating terrorism.").
165. The reorganization of the FBI to emphasize terrorism preven-
tion has a deep resonance with the types of actions taken by indi-
viduals to ensure safety in the wake of traumatic events. See Susan
Schmidt, Terrorism Focus Set For FBI; Mueller's Reorganization
Would Shift 480 Agents, WASH. POST, May 29, 2002, at Al. The
fear of helplessness many felt after 9/11 relates not only to their
post-event condition, but also to the recognition that nothing their
government had done served to prevent 9/11 from happening. Id.
166. See Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, Hijackers' Visa Fi-
asco Points Up INS Woes; System Fails So Often It's Not Even Ex-
pected to Work, Immigration Experts Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
2002, at A20 (discussing the "embarrassing news that a Florida
flight school had belatedly received visa approval notices for two
dead Sept. 11 hijackers").
167. See id.
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Beyond this, some laws that will emerge farther in the future - but
will be indelibly etched in the public mind as connected to 9/11 -
will be no more obvious to hindsight than the GI Bill would have
appeared in 1942. At present, we cannot clearly tell what form those
laws will take. In the middle of an armed conflict there is under-
standable preoccupation and little opportunity to develop a survivor
mission for 9/11. Still, there are those who have looked beyond the
narrow focus of conducting the war. A broad spectrum of theologi-
ans, pundits, academics, so-called "terrorism experts" and the like
offer a wide range of views on what happened and why, and what
form the national response shall take. Definitive pronouncements
have been made by pundits willing to offer unqualified opinions
about our new reality. Some demand changes in foreign policy be-
cause they believe resentment of America fueled the attacks.' 68 So
called "hawks" press for more military spending. Advocates of
globalization say it is now more essential than ever, while opponents
speak of a new American unilateralism, which finds its most potent
expression in the war in Iraq. Yet amid the present cacophony of
voices, it is hard to tell who speaks with clarity. There must be pearls
of wisdom scattered about; after all, it is believed that some people
were right about 9/11 had anyone listened to their warning.
69
Nevertheless, we can begin to make a tentative short list of adap-
tive resources that seem to be prominent in discussions about the
aftermath of 9/11, which may well help steer public policy. Some of
these resources relate to specific actions that a number of people
168. See, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, And Now This: Lessons From
the Old Era For the New One, in THE AGE OF TERROR, supra note
16, at 3, 11-18 (noting that "our foreign policy since the cold war
ended has insufficiently served our interests" and discussing the rea-
sons for resentment of America in the world); Bill McKibben, An
End to Sweet Illusions, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 38. Of
course, there is nothing new about the charge that democratic repub-
lics make missteps and lack coherence in the sphere of foreign pol-
icy. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 9 (citing a criticism dat-
ing to de Tocqueville that "democracies have great difficulties sus-
taining serious and long-term foreign policies"). But the chorus for
change in the wake of 9/11 seems especially loud.
169. See, e.g., STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICAN JIHAD: THE
TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG US (2002) (detailing more than ten
years' experience studying terror movements and predicting attacks).
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have taken to deal with the trauma induced by 9/11, creating the
foundation for a lasting shift in preferences. There is, for instance,
an increased interest in developing networks for personal support,
which one historian calls "tribal closeness."' 70 In the months after
9/11, many of us reached out to loved ones and even neighbors with
whom we had previously not had much contact; pattern markers that
would tend to support this include trends in cell phone usage and the
like. Survivors of 9/11 who find this most relevant to their recovery
might push for more extensive networking of individuals and entities
(public and private) in society as a whole. Without rehashing the
difficulties of defining a "community," which are thoroughly ex-
plored elsewhere,17 1 one may infer that land-use laws allowing
tighter neighborhood clusters, or transportation laws that make new
reliable high-speed connections possible, will find stronger support
after 9/11.
1. Preference For Low-Profile, Low-Risk Networks
Another adaptive resource may well be a preference for production
and distribution networks of staples of life that have two salient
characteristics: low profiles to make it far less likely that these sys-
tems would face terrorist attacks, and a related feature, overall low
risks of disruption of resource availability. Terror's biggest threat is
the random attack that disrupts society. In the aftermath of 9/11,
there has been considerable concern about means of production and
distribution of basic staples such as food, water, and energy. Terror-
ists slammed into urban buildings because they were prominent
symbols of American power, but also because they were relatively
easier to target due to their size and location.172 Overcoming the fear
170. See Christopher Dickey & Daniel Klaidman, How Will Israel
Survive?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2002, at 22 (quoting a statement by
author and historian Tom Segev that terrorism - in this case the Pal-
estinian intifada - "pushes us back into tribal closeness").
171. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1047 (1996) (calling for a new urban policy based on com-
munity building); see generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2000).
172. See, e.g., Mark Felsenthal, Another Casualty of Attack: Sky-
scrapers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 16, 2001, at G5 (quoting Uni-
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of a terrorist attack and replacing it with empowerment virtually re-
quires us to look around for other comparable targets and to protect
them.
However, there is more to the idea of creating a low profile than
simple protection, which we may well be virtually impossible. For
example, it is exceedingly difficult to protect every urban transit sys-
tem from attack by a suitcase bomb. Once one views that goal as
impossible, then the appropriate response would be to replace
prominent targets with less prominent ones to the maximum extent
possible. As a result, there would be a need for legal structures that
favor decentralized, reliable means of production over those that are
massive and vulnerable to attack. Arguments will be made that
seismic shifts in the production of staples would require compensa-
tion for mothballing of expensive infrastructure, and might fail to
ensure that basic needs will be met. The likely responses are that
there may be means to provide the same or greater level of resources
(unless we cut back our level of consumption, which of course is a
possibility), and there may be ways to replace outmoded infrastruc-
ture and compensate owners in some fashion. 73
The idea of overall low risk with respect to staples of life is a
slightly different one. It is a focus not so much on the vulnerability
versity of Wisconsin engineering professor Awad Hanna's statement
that "To build a structure with a capacity for 40,000 people - it's a
clear target."); Jesus Sanchez, Fewer Skyscrapers Likely to Be Built
in Shadow of Attack, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A32 (noting that
"[t]he high-profile, prestige and size that attract image-conscious
businesses to such buildings are the same features that make them
attractive targets").
173. An example in the energy arena, the subject of the next sec-
tion, is the effort by various states to compensate utilities for so-
called "stranded costs" (costs of infrastructure utilities assert they
cannot recover due to deregulation of the electricity industry). See
U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ELECTRIC UTILITIES: DEREGULATION
AND STRANDED COSTS (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=976&sequence=0#pt2 (last viewed Oct. 31,
2003); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATUS OF
STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg-str/scosts.html (last
viewed Oct. 31, 2003) (charting the progress of recovery of stranded
costs in each state's deregulation proceedings).
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of production and distribution systems to attack as on minimizing
the reasons to fear that terrorist actions will disrupt availability of
basic resources. These two attributes overlap; if there are fewer
high-profile terrorist targets there is a decreased risk of resource
shortages. Yet, decreasing the risk of shortages means much more.
Such action could lead to a preference for more compact, more
streamlined distribution networks.
As an example of the current perilous status of our infrastructure,
if all supermarkets were to close tomorrow it would be difficult for
most of us to obtain food. Farms have consolidated into large opera-
tions far removed from most urban centers. The reliability of this
production and distribution system could be improved by narrowing
the gap between agricultural conglomerates and the dinner table.
We could grow some of our own food, and certainly some modem
update of the "Victory Garden" would be beneficial. More impor-
tantly would be laws encouraging a network of small-scale agricul-
ture that will not fail when large systems go down and which are
within the reach of the average city dweller. 174 The benefits of re-
dundant small-scale production have been made obvious for dec-
ades, but we have not acted in any systematic way to capitalize upon
them. It is hardly a novel idea; one of the first books I read was
Small Is Beautiful.175 The promising field of "biomimetics" involves
ways to foster production using devices that more closely mimic
nature in their smaller size and overlapping redundancy. 176 The idea
that as a result of our recovery we will see things differently adds a
unique perspective on the merit of this approach.
174. One battleground in this area in recent years is the develop-
ment of state land use laws that attempt to protect and set aside land
on the urban periphery for farming. See, e.g., John C. Becker, Pro-
moting Agricultural Development Through Land Use Planning Lim-
its, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 619 (2002); Mark W. Cordes,
Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future Directions, 22 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 419 (2002). These laws are controversial but might be
viewed in a more positive light if considered to be essential for na-
tional recovery.
175. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL (1973).
176. VOGEL, supra note 136, at 319 (noting how a number of small
motors can be conjoined into something approximating muscle).
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2. A Potential Focus: Energy Independence
The scale of the September 11 events and the vastness of
the economic impact makes it imperative that the United
States take urgent and tough action to reduce energy sys-
tem vulnerabilities, notably those related to oil imports,
nuclear power plants and associated infrastructure, and
the electricity grid. 177
Many see a connection between 9/11 and our dependence on for-
eign oil. Our need to import oil bolsters skeptics' arguments that we
are combating terror for the wrong reasons, 178 and blinds us to the
considerable imperfections of oil producing nations (including their
record of harboring and supporting terrorists). 179 Our failure to rat-
ify the Kyoto treaty on global warming 18 and take measurable steps
177. ARJUN MAKHIJANI, INST. FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH,
SECURING THE ENERGY FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES: OIL,
NUCLEAR, AND ELECTRICITY VULNERABILITIES AND A POST-
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ROADMAP FOR ACTION (2001), available at
http://www.ieer.org/reports/energy/bushsumm.html (last viewed Oct.
31, 2003).
178. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, A Failure to Imagine, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2002, § 4, at 15 (criticizing these arguments).
179. A number of possible connections between Middle Eastern
governments and terrorism have been probed since 9/11, including
charities funneling funds to terrorist groups. See, e.g., Michael M.
Phillips, U.S., Saudi Arabia to Freeze Assets Of 2 Branches of an
Islamic Charity, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2002, at A2 (examining the
link between charities, terrorists, and the Saudi government); Wil-
liam O'Rourke, Terror War Should Not Skip Saudis; Nation Has
Obvious Ties to Those Who Want to Destroy Us, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2001, at 3.
180. The Kyoto Treaty is a protocol (amendment) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (opened for signa-
ture Mar. 16, 1998). Intense negotiations among delegates to nego-
tiate a protocol embodying specific limits on greenhouse gas emis-
sions culminated in a document that incorporated long-term emis-
sions targets. Kyoto Protocol, supra, at Art. 3 (imposing obligation
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to curb fossil fuel use does disservice to our international public im-
age, even as we call for international coalitions to stop terror.' For
on countries listed in Annex I) and Annex I (listing the U.S. with a
7% reduction target). The protocol was rejected by the Bush Ad-
ministration. See William Drozdiak, U.S. Left Out of Warming
Treaty; EU-Japan Bargain Saves Kyoto Pact, WASH. POST, July 24,
2001, at Al; Eric Pianin, U.S. Aims to Pull Out of Warming Treaty,
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2001, at Al (noting that EPA Administrator
Whitman called the Kyoto Protocol "dead").
Since this development the protocol has been ratified by major
industrial nations but to date the Senate has not ratified it and the
Administration continues to oppose it. See Colum Lynch, EU Rati-
fies Global Warming Treaty; Kyoto Accord En Route to Becoming
Law Despite U.S. Rejection, WASH. POST, June 1, 2002, at A15 (not-
ing also that "[t]he environmental accord has been the source of
enormous political tension between the United States, the world's
largest polluter, and many of its closest allies, particularly in
Europe."). The Bush Administration's recent actions on global cli-
mate change have hardly signaled a willingness to accept limitations
on carbon dioxide emissions. The Clear Skies Act, the Administra-
tion's proposed "multi-pollutant legislation" for controlling emis-
sions from power plants, makes no reference to carbon dioxide emis-
sions. See S. 485, 108th Cong., (2003). In contrast, the "Clean
Power Act," which was reported out of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee in 2002, and, upon its failure to reach the
Senate floor, reintroduced in 2003, contains specific carbon dioxide
limits. See S. 366, 108th Cong., (2003); H.R. 5206, 107th Cong.,
(2002); S. 556, 107th Cong., (2002). See also Jim Jeffords, Un-
healthy Air, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, § 4, at 15 (Senator Jeffords,
chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
notes that President Bush criticized the National Academy of Sci-
ences report calling global warming a "real and significant threat,"
and proposed rollbacks of the Clean Air Act "new source review"
provisions that would allow old power plants to escape moderniza-
tion requirements and continue to emit "large amounts of carbon
dioxide, a greenhouse gas").
181. See INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL. RESEARCH,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES ARE FUNDAMENTAL TOOLS FOR
PROTECTING GLOBAL SECURITY; UNITED STATES FACES CHOICE OF
BOLSTERING THESE REGIMES OR ALLOWING THEIR EROSION (2002),
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the moment, I will put aside these geopolitical considerations and
concentrate on how our overuse of petroleum and other energy
sources makes us vulnerable to terrorists. Much imported oil is used
in the transportation sector.' 82 SUVs themselves aren't real terror
targets, but the oil production and distribution system that provides
fuel for them is a large target. An ambitious terrorist could wreak
havoc by attacking a pipeline, supertanker, or refinery.' 83 If we are
to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks, we need alternative technolo-
gies or cutbacks in consumption that will decrease our need for fuels
coming from these central facilities.
Concerning electricity generation, our use of oil is considerably
less than at the time of the first OPEC oil embargo, thus it is rela-
tively inconsequential to focus on the politics of imported oil when
discussing this area.184 Instead, we should look at how our generat-
available at http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/factsht.html (last
viewed Oct. 31, 2003) (criticizing the failure to ratify the Kyoto pro-
tocol and other international treaties); see also Thomas L. Friedman,
Better Late Than..., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, § 4 at 15:
We need to find a way to ratify the Kyoto climate change
treaty. It's not only the right thing to do, but it would
also send a hugely positive signal to the world - that
America understands that if it's going to have lasting al-
lies in a global war on terrorism, it has to be the best
global citizen it can be.
182. See J.W. Anderson, The Surge in Oil Prices: Anatomy of a
Non-Crisis, RES. FOR THE FUTURE 6 (2000), available at
http://rff.org/CFDOCS/disc-papers/PDFfiles/0017.pdf (last viewed
Oct. 31, 2003) (stating that "[t]wo-thirds of the oil this country now
uses is highway fuel."). Oil use has actually fallen in other areas.
Charles C. Mann, Getting Over Oil, TECH. REV., Jan./Feb. 2002, at
33, 34.
183. See Makhijani, supra note 178 (noting that "those [events] of
September 11 have pointed up the need to urgently reconsider the
domestic energy infrastructure, even as it has dramatically reinforced
consideration of security of oil supplies"); Mann, supra note 184, at
38 (asking readers to imagine the impacts on current low oil prices
of "the effects of terrorist attacks against pipelines or oilfields").
184. Mann, supra note 184, at 34 (noting that "almost one-fifth of
U.S. electricity was generated by petroleum in 1973; today the figure
is less than one one-hundredth.").
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ing capacity makes for high-profile targets for terrorists. Nuclear
power plants have already been identified as vulnerable,' 85 and it
does not require speculation to envision that transmission lines and
centralized fossil fuel-fired plants, that generate much of our elec-
tricity,186 are vulnerable as well. In order to move toward a low-
profile, low-risk environment for generating electricity, we have two
fundamental alternatives: use less electricity, thereby reducing the
need for central stations or build alternatives that do not rely as much
on central generation. This is the same choice, more or less, that we
face in the transportation sector.
a. Use Less Energy
The fundamental problem with using less energy is that we have
heretofore resisted it mightily. Americans consume more energy per
capita than any other nation (in most cases, far more).187 We are
working to make manufacturing processes more energy efficient and
environmentally friendly, but have not yet completely succeeded. 188
185. See, e.g., Makhijani, supra note 178 (listing the various ways
in which nuclear power plants are vulnerable); Richard L. Ottinger
& Rebecca Williams, Renewable Energy Sources For Development,
32 ENVTL. L. 331, 334 (2002) (arguing that "an overriding concern
with nuclear plants is their great vulnerability to terrorist attack [par-
ticularly on the control rooms and spent fuel ponds that are located
outside the containment vessels].").
186. Nearly eighty percent of the energy produced in the United
States in 1999 came from fossil fuels. See U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ENERGY OVERVIEW (Mar. 2002), at
Table 1.3, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/
pages/secl.pdf (last viewed Oct. 31, 2003).
187. Ed Ring, World Energy Consumption: The Good, The Bad,
and The BTUs, available at http://www.ecoworld.org/Energy/
Articles/articles2.cfm?TID=294 (last viewed Oct. 31, 2003) (relying
on 1995 data supplied by the World Bank).
188. According to data provided by the Department of Energy, the
amount of energy we consume per dollar of gross domestic product
is decreasing. See ENERGY OVERVIEW, supra note 188, at Table 1.8.
For an overview of current and potential improvements in energy-
using processes, see generally WILLIAM MCDONOUGH & MICHAEL
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Worse yet, we continue to be a nation in the tenacious grasp of a
laissez-faire, energy-hogging consumer culture. Evidence of this is
plainly available; one need only consult the bestseller list. David
Brooks' Bobos in Paradise deftly skewers the worship of consump-
tion by the baby boom generation. 189 The type of vehicle you drive,
particularly if it happens to be the right kind of SUV, says more
about you than your opinions on issues of the day. 190 Eric
Schlosser's Fast Food Nation'9' details painstakingly how our love
of hamburgers and fried chicken has catalyzed the growth of energy-
wasting food production and distribution systems. The food industry
is responsible for such comprehensive changes to our way of life that
McDonalds' restaurants are viewed as archetypal symbols of Amer-
ica throughout the world. 92 Supplying these restaurants has be-
come the exclusive province of corporations, which, some argue,
care little about environmental regulations or improving wasteful
energy practices. 93
BRAUNGART, CRADLE TO CRADLE: REMAKING THE WAY WE MAKE
THINGS (2002).
189. DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW UPPER CLASS
AND How THEY GOT THERE (2000).
190. Id. at 86 (describing the appeal of the term "sport utility vehi-
cle"). Decrying the diminishing engagement of those with means in
political life, of course, is nothing new among social critics. See,
e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF
THE MIDDLE CLASS 249 (1989) (noting that "[t]he suburban middle
class has of course long since withdrawn, geographically and often
mentally, from the challenges of a diverse and unequal society.");
PUTNAM, supra note 172, at 31-48 (providing data that tends to show
a "disengagement from public affairs"). See generally RICHARD
FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS AND How IT'S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE
(2002) (showing similar observations).
191. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE
AMERICAN MEAL (2001).
192. See id. at 243-44.
193. Michael Pollan, This Steer's Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002,
§ 6, at 44, 69 (noting that beef cattle produced for slaughter are "the
product of an industrial system dominated by fossil fuel");
SCHLOSSER, supra note 193, at 134 (noting the adverse environ-
mental impacts of ranching). See also J.B. Ruhl, The Environmental
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Consumption has always been intertwined with status. One may
argue that such a condition has now reached a higher order of magni-
tude, yet in a specific way that imperils any attempt at restriction or
reformation. Brooks notes that among the new upper class it is not
consumption for its own sake but a self-centered "code of financial
correctness" designed "to help them convert their wealth into spiri-
tually and intellectually uplifting experiences' 1 94 that drives con-
sumptive behavior. That so much that is "uPscale" (to employ pos-
sibly the most overused word of the late 20m and early 2 1st century)
is wasteful is lost on the person who must have the latest high-tech
kitchen or Cadillac Escalade SUV.195 This behavior is so ingrained
that the law probably cannot change its worst features, even that law
generated in the aftermath of 9/11. The poor performance record of
previous attempts at curtailing consumption in this country is testa-
ment to this observation. 1
96
The Washington establishment is responsible for a stalemate that
prevents the enactment of even the mildest of measures to encourage
energy efficiency and conservation. While the Bush Administration
Law of Farms: 30 Years of Making a Mole Hill Out of a Mountain,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 203 (Feb. 2001) (arguing that failure to regu-
late environmental consequences of farming has created an "anti-
law," and noting the "propensity toward vertical integration" of re-
lated industries); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOL. L. Q. 263 (2000).
194. BROOKS, supra note 191, at 84.
195. Id. at 85.
196. See James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law,
24 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1245 (1997) (noting that "more goods and ser-
vices have been consumed since 1950 than by all previous genera-
tions combined," and claiming that "stringent regulation of polluting
industries will not ensure environmental protection if current trends
of consumption continue over the longer term"). With respect to one
commodity that we consume in large quantities - gasoline - demand
is only likely to subside if there is a "substantial hike in gas prices."
David J. DePippo, I'll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maxi-
mized, With a Side of Inelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543,
559 (2002). In the current regulatory climate a tax that would in-
crease prices is not likely to be enacted.
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has been rightly criticized for its retrograde energy policy,'97 Con-
gress continues to block new automotive mileage standards, even
though they are well below the current state-of-the art and would not
force new, more efficient vehicles to the market in large numbers.' 98
It is a measure of the current lack of a national political will that
technology-forcing standards that would change driving behavior are
only possible in California, by virtue of its Clean Air Act exemption
197. See NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, RELIABLE,
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR
AMERICA'S FUTURE (2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/energy (last viewed Oct. 31, 2003). The Bush Ad-
ministration policy was criticized from its inception by environmen-
talists, other public interest groups, and commentators, in part be-
cause it seemed inapt after 9/11 to rely on expanding conventional
forms of production. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy
Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341
(2002); David J. Hayes, Energy-Again, But With a Kicker, NAT.
RES. & ENV'T, at 215, 216 (Spring 2002) (noting that "it is mislead-
ing, at best, to suggest that energy "independence" can be achieved
with additional domestic oil production); Makhijani, supra note 178
(noting that "[i]t is stunning that the Bush administration has not
revisited its energy plan proposed four months prior to September 11
in light of the events of that day"); see Friedman, supra note 183 at
15 (noting that President Bush has "exploited the shock of Sept. 11
to argue why his same old, pre-Sept. 11 policies were still the only
way to proceed - only more so" and pointing to the call for "even
more drilling for oil in wilderness areas" as an example). Congres-
sional action has been criticized as well. See, e.g., Alliance to Save
Energy Rebukes U.S. Senate For "Pitiful Showing" on Energy Effi-
ciency in Major Energy Bill, Alliance to Save Energy, available at
http://www.ase.org/media/newsrel/senategetsd.htm (last viewed Apr.
25, 2002) (giving the Senate a "D+" grade for the energy efficiency
provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2002).
198. As introduced, the Energy Policy Act included a provision
that would have raised auto fuel economy (CAFE) standards to 35
miles per gallon by 2015. S. 1766, 107th Cong. (2001). On March
13, 2002, the Senate voted 62-38 to strip this provision from the bill.
See Senate Running on Empty on Fuel Economy, Alliance to Save
Energy, at http://www.ase.org/media/newsrel/senate fail.htm (last
viewed Mar. 13, 2002) (criticizing the vote).
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that allows it to set standards that differ from the national counter-
part. 199
Fostering the political will needed to overcome this resistance has
been difficult as we have relied on setting up Middle Eastern nations
as bogeymen, with a predictable lack of success as long as OPEC
continues to keep open the oil tap. If that situation should change,
and there are occasional threats that it might, 2°° we could incur a
shock to the economy that could prompt the same drive for energy
independence as initiated in the 1970s. Lacking such imperative,
there is a low likelihood for change.
b. Produce Energy Differently
When we pull up to the gas station or flip a light switch, most of us
do not think of the vulnerability of the complex network of facilities
required to sustain our present level of energy consumption. There
is plenty of opportunity for early adapters to learn more about the
energy production and distribution system, and attempt to reshape it
with laws that encourage changes in the way energy is produced. 2° 1
One goal might be the implementation of laws encouraging smaller-
scale power generation technologies that are less vulnerable to at-
tack. By focusing on lowering risk, we could see a drastic shift from
199. See Paul Rogers, State Could Set Auto Trend; Global-
Warming Bill Linked to Gas Mileage, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, July 15,
2002, at 1 (describing California's legislation [A.B. 1493] that
would toughen gas mileage standards indirectly by requiring lower
greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles).
200. Iraq attempted to begin a new oil embargo in May 2002, but
failed to win support from other oil-producing nations. See Iraq Em-
bargo Off After Fellow Oil Exporters Ignore Calls to Follow Suit,
OIL DAILY (May 7, 2002) available at 2002 WL 5641829 (noting
that "When Baghdad halted oil exports last month to protest Israeli
incursions into Palestinian territory, its calls for other producers to
join an embargo fell on deaf ears.").
201. I am hardly the first to see this as a possible outgrowth of
9/11. See Friedman, supra note 179 (criticizing President Bush for
"squandering all the positive feeling in America after 9/11, particu-
larly among young Americans who wanted to be drafted for a great
project that would strengthen America in some lasting way - a Man-
hattan project for energy independence").
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central generation to decentralized forms of generation such as inex-
pensive solar cells or fuel cells; z°2 small oil- or gas-fired generators
in every backyard would not be vulnerable to attack themselves but
could be shut down if a pipeline is attacked. In support of this shift
in energy production, one could imagine, for example, a streamlined
approval process and grant program that would allow individuals to
make their own electricity from fuel cells, build a simple distribution
203network (with federal support), and sell it to their neighbors. At
present, the institution of such a network would likely face licensing
and other requirements. Furthermore, its dependence on the existing
transmission grid would in itself pose a tempting terror target. 204
The fundamental problem with the Bush Administration's National
Energy Policy is that it would continue our reliance on conventional
production and distribution; it would in fact increase through such
measures as the "safe expansion" of our nuclear energy program and
202. The technology necessary to switch from nuclear and fossil
fuels is hardly science fiction. See Makhijani, supra note 178 (noting
that "[t]he technologies to achieve the goal of simultaneously reduc-
ing carbon dioxide emissions and vulnerabilities to attack already
exist. Some, such as wind energy and cogeneration, are already eco-
nomical. Others will need suitable government procurement policies
to make them economical. All of the needed technologies are ad-
vanced enough that they can be commercialized within the next five
to ten years."); see also David H. Freedman, Fuel Cells vs. The Grid,
105 TECH. REV. 40 (Jan./Feb. 2002) (discussing the potential for fuel
cells to "offer clean electricity to offices and homes).
203. Freedman, supra note 204, at 45 (offering a technical discus-
sion of how that might take place).
204. See Makhijani, supra note 178 (noting the vulnerability of the
electricity transmission grid, recommending that:
A national policy decision should be made to create re-
gional distributed electricity grids in the next three to four
decades. In these regional grids, a large proportion of the
electricity would come from 'relatively dispersed genera-
tors, where installation of generation systems would be
accompanied by efficiency improvements. Regulatory
changes should be geared to encouraging the achieve-
ment of a distributed grid, rather than a centralized na-
tional grid of interconnected local and centralized elec-
tricity generation.) Id. (emphasis added).
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by opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to exploration and
development. 2 5 While there are some initiatives for alternative and
renewable energy resources in the policy, 20 6 they do not do enough
to diminish our reliance on central generating plants - ready and
visible terror targets.20 7 The policy predated 9/1 and for that reason
its goals are different than one would expect in such a report. How-
ever, in the acrimonious debate in Congress which did take place
after 9/11, Administration representatives defended the policy, and
the omnibus energy bill moving through Congress in 2003 largely
208reflects current thinking. However, this sort of status quo reason-
ing may well yield to the demands of a populace motivated to think
differently in the aftermath of 9/11.
III. CRITIQUES OF THE MODEL
As I have noted above, this model of post-traumatic societal adap-
tation is not without its potential shortcomings. The most obvious is
that it is predicated upon a number of assumptions about behavior
that reinforce each other and may time proven to be wrong. Perhaps
I have been immersed in these books for so long that I am simply
205. NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, supra note 199, at ch. 5-
9. Despite setbacks in Congress, the Administration continues to
push for development of ANWR. See H. Josef Hebert, Senator:
ANWR Plan Won't Make Bill; Domenici Says One More Run at
Alaska Drilling Will Fail, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2003, at A7.
206. NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, RELIABLE,
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR
AMERICA'S FUTURE (2001), supra note 199, at ch. 6.
207. Makhijani, supra note 178 (noting that "the Bush administra-
tion is on an unsound course of recommending an energy policy to
the people of this country in the post September 11-period without
revisiting its key vulnerabilities" and claiming that "[t]he Bush ad-
ministration's energy plan will result in greatly increased vulner-
abilities by... increasing the attractiveness of and number of targets
for terrorism particularly in the nuclear, oil, and electricity sys-
tems.").
208. See Energy Policy Act, H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (2003) (marked
up by the House Energy and Commerce Committee on April 4,
2003).
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overexaggerating the role of trauma and recovery in influencing na-
tional policy.2°9 Yet, even if the trauma and recovery process turns
out to be a less significant force, it still can be a useful paradigmatic
lens through which to assess our various responses to 9/11. The
state-of-the-art in trauma study is certainly inadequate, but dealing
with the issues presented for 9/11 and its aftermath is still far better
than the alternative of ignoring it; that is just another form of denial.
1. Proceeding from Individual Behavior is Problematic:
The Analogy to "Law and Behavioral Economics"
Nonetheless, basing a model on behavior requires some careful
consideration of the rather bold leap from the largely individual-
centered process of trauma and recovery to the collective response of
public policy. I am well aware that it is problematic to relate a be-
havioral phenomenon - the personal journey to recover from trauma
- to broader societal policies of any sort. One set of problems is
comparable to those besetting scholars trying to make headway in
"law and behavioral economics. ' 21° Consider the disputes over that
field's foundational assumptions about human foibles and their rela-
tionship to economics ("anomalies" 2' 1). Some may perceive that
these anomalies are only the equivalent of sophisticated party games,
not the basis for law. 21 2 Whether I am willing to drink wine from
209. This is reminiscent of what a leading scholar on trauma calls
"Medical Student's Disease": hearing about a disease or affliction
makes one overestimate its rate of occurrence. ALLEN, supra note
38, at 16.
210. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
211. Economist Richard Thaler is the originator of this term. See
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 2 (1992) (stating that "[a]n anomaly
is a fact or observation which is inconsistent with the theory").
212. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path From Obser-
vation to Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 39 (2002) (observing
that "the empirical observations [in behavioral economics] are either
insufficiently robust or amenable to conflicting interpretation,
thereby limiting their ability to offer reliable generalizations," and
that "empiricism does not readily generate normative conclusions");
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my collection but not readily willing to spend the amount it would
take to replace it,213 may be quite entertaining to regale friends over
chardonnay and brie, but is hardly the rigorous stuff upon which law
should be built.
One might imagine two distinct but related problems. The first I
will call gravity: there does not appear to be any serious jurispruden-
tial basis for using an anomaly, as real as it may be in the world of
wallets and wine, as the normative foundation of law. 2 1  In this
view, more emphasis should be given to established principles of
215political economy than these party quirks. The cruel irony in a
recovery process based, in part, on self-awareness is its relationship
to much of what has generated difficulty in the first place: the na-
tional craze for self-awareness and the entire industry that has sprung
up to feed the craze. This observation underscores the great difficul-
ties inherent in distinguishing between what is legitimately done in
the name of self-awareness and recovery, and what is just self-
centered. Endless tapes, TV shows,2 16 workshops and the like pro-
mote a myriad of approaches to recovery, presenting the link to the
trauma of 9/11 as a prescription for public policy leading down the
slippery slope which ends just with another meeting of a support
group and take a Zoloft®.
Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of
Public Law, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 671 (2002).
213. See THALER, supra note 213, at 63. Thaler terms this the "en-
dowment effect": "people often demand much more to give up an
object than they would pay to acquire it." Id. See also Cass R. Sun-
stein, Switching The Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002)
(discussing the endowment effect in a number of legal contexts and
proposing that default rules be reversed to accommodate it).
214. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 739, 764 (2000) (detailing Judge Richard Posner's critique of
behavioral economics on this ground).
215. Id. (noting that Judge Posner believes behavioral economics
may turn out to be a "sideshow").
216. It may be argued that currently, psychology for the masses
comes in the form of a syndicated television show. See Douglas
Durden, Psychology Today, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 20, 2002,
at G4 (discussing the advent of the "Dr. Phil" show featuring clinical
psychologist Phillip McGraw).
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Gravity does not appear to pose an insurmountable problem to be-
havioral economists, who observe that behavioral observations are
adding to, not replacing the foundation of law. We base substantial
chunks of public policy on imperfect economic models, and taking
behavior into account allows us to amplify upon those models or
replace them with better ones.217 Central to this issue, the appeal of
behavioral economic theory about more than "changing the numbers
in the law-and-economics equations; ' '218 it prompts us to ask "unique
questions about law that legal scholars would not otherwise have
asked. 21 9 Moreover, I am not challenging specific normative as-
sumptions upon which a body of law is predicated, with the purpose
of replacing them with my own. This model is not "trauma and eco-
nomics". While I do suggest some possible types of law that
could change, the appropriateness of that change would still need to
be tested by conventional political and economic means. The model,
therefore, helps to predict the direction of change, not its legitimacy.
The essential response of behavioral economics is inclusiveness:
all law needs to become behavioral. Professor Cass Sunstein and his
collaborators have claimed that twenty years from now the relation-
ship among psychology, research and law will be better defined.22'
In developing theories to support normative law we will take into
account this relationship just as we take into account other aspects of
the human character that are regulated by law. In practice, of course,
we are still a long way from figuring out what that means. 222 Manycritics of behavioral economics have noted that if today's empirical
217. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471,
1546-47 (1998) (noting that classical economics theories can be
''simply wrong," and pointing to new directions in which behavioral
influences should be studied).
218. Rachlinski, supra note 216, at 764.
219. Id. at 766.
220. See id. at 763 (noting that the "primary use" of scholarship in
behavioral economics "will be to undermine law and economics").
221. See generally Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 219.
222. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 214, at 40-42 (discussing a
behavioral economics approach to the "at will" rule of employment
and finding that the observed discrepancy from classical economic
assumptions "does not in itself drive any particular policy prescrip-
tion").
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studies give us good information about behavior, variations make it
difficult to generalize to the extent necessary for use in the legal sys-
tem. For now, I have to admit that my response is no better than
informed supposition in need of empirical verification: I believe,
based on our understanding of trauma and recovery, that the path of
change will be altered when a critical mass of people have essen-
tially similar notions based on adaptive resources.
2. Avoidance and Denial: Problems Relating to the Passage of Time
Another set of problems relates to the avoidance and denial that
characterize our reaction to trauma, and the passage of time that ex-
acerbates these problems. We tend to think of adaptive resources as
evanescent: you "do what you have to" to recover from trauma, thus
you return to the status quo once you have recovered. The central
idea of the recovery process, however, is that many have experi-
enced a re-creation of the self. There is a critical distinction to be
made here between actions taken in dire circumstances (which might
not be repeated) and the skills developed during the recovery process
(which can endure). Even those who have only coped with trauma,
and are therefore not changed in some fundamental way, may well
have memories that would allow the survivor mission to appeal to
them. I may not make dozens of cell phone calls in one day again,
but I certainly recall how important it was for me to be close to my
friends and family.
There are other reasons why we might think of trauma and recov-
ery as presently unimportant. Recognition of trauma and its effects
challenges "[o]rdinary social processes of silencing and denial. 223
This silencing process makes us constantly tempted to downplay or
even suppress any role that trauma and recovery may have in socie-
tal change.224 One such process of denial is evidenced by the com-
ments of those who believe we should not change at all because to
do so would be to capitulate to the terrorists. This misses the point.
Change may be necessary because we believe that it is essential to
our healing process, not because we capitulate to the warped ideol-
ogy of the terrorists.
223. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 9.
224. Id. at 7-8 (noting, for example, that "[w]ithout a supportive
social environment, the bystander usually succumbs to the tempta-
tion to look the other way.").
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This tendency to suppress the role of trauma is exacerbated by the
fact that recovery from trauma is hardly the only force impacting
change in a society. Laws created in the decades after a dislocation
will be in large part the product of other, unrelated forces: societal
change brought on by the dislocation, normal evolution of the legal
system (to the extent there is such a thing), and impacts brought to
bear by persons who have no connection to the dislocation. This is
evident when observing the women's movement. It is obvious now
that not all feminists have had an experience with rape and that
feminism is about much more than rape.
None of this is to suggest that the model is fundamentally flawed.
I do not mean to imply that the trauma and recovery process is the
sole mechanism that may explain the possible evolution of our laws
in the decades ahead. Others would tie societal change more closely
to advances in science, but I am not one of them.225 However, this
does not suggest that there is more complexity to the attribution
process than I have previously described. There are two primary
forces weighing against proper attribution which might best be
termed active resistance (opposition to the survivor mission, de-
scribed earlier) and passive resistance (avoidance and denial leading
to downplaying the role of trauma and recovery). Both are likely to
be stubborn barriers to legal progress.
3. Is a Social Movement Necessary?
This leads one to consider that a stronger counterbalancing force
on the advocacy side may be necessary to effect change - that is,
that trauma and recovery may be a significant force for change only
in the context of a societal movement. It is not coincidental that
many of my analogies have involved references to the women's
movement. There is a common but mistaken perception that survi-
vors, with their notions of empowerment, are overly strident in im-
posing their views on the rest of society.22 6 A social movement can
225. Francis Fukuyama, in THE END OF HISTORY, claims that the
direction of "modem natural science" is a "possible underlying
'mechanism' of directional historical change." FUKUYAMA, supra
note 2, at 80. But see, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 136, at 150 (finding it
difficult to "tie history to physiology").
226. See McFarlane & van der Kolk, Trauma and Its Challenge to
Society, supra note 81, at 38 (noting that "Contrary to general per-
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help survivors prevail over criticism (particularly doubts about the
legitimacy of their claims), and it is therefore no accident that the
ascent of political movements correlates chronologically with the
cycles of the rise of interest in trauma.227 However, this does not
mean that the existence of a movement is indispensable for trauma
and recovery to play an important role in national policy. The uni-
versality of 9/11 makes it quite different from contexts in which the
link between trauma and movements has been evaluated thus far
(particularly the women's movement and advocacy of Holocaust
survivors). These involved situations where trauma victims chal-
lenged established mainstream beliefs. 9/11 does not pose such a
problem because it affected everyone in the nation. The large num-
ber of trauma victims can themselves provide the societal support
necessary for survivors.
However, as I have noted earlier, the political dynamics that would
operate to bring early adapters' ideas to fruition are not understood
in this context. It is therefore completely untested whether there can
be widespread interest in trauma, and resulting influence in the po-
litical system, without the existence of a movement. Part of the
problem is the nascent nature of any effort to link behavior and
law.2 8 Psychologists have not traditionally been as concerned with
this link between individual behavior and the dynamics of the public
ceptions, few victims make shrill demands for compensation and
special privileges. Many victims quietly acquiesce in their suffer-
ing.").
227. HERMAN, supra note 13, at 9; Yehuda & McFarlane, supra
note 45, at 43 (noting that "[t]he human rights issues that emerged in
the investigation of the effects of torture and political repression,
civil rights issues, and the rise of feminism all resulted in an increas-
ing urgency to address the plight of the traumatized individual.").
Members of the new generation of historians who aim to revise con-
ventional wisdom to include the contributions of excluded groups
such as women would do well to explore this link further. The social
movements that many of them claim to represent were started by
those who experienced traumatic events, and an understanding of
trauma and recovery would be useful to amplify upon their conclu-
sions.
228. See Issacharoff, The Difficult Path, supra note 214, at 39 (not-
ing that behavioral economics is a "relatively young field emerging
from the social science tradition").
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sphere as one might think proper.229 One senses, as I have noted in
the development of the model, that for change to happen, the adap-
tive resources must be tightly related in large concentrations of peo-
ple. This, like many other building blocks of the model, requires
testing over time.
CONCLUSION
Jeffrey Rachlinski, an advocate of behavioral economics, notes
that "[t]he extension of psychology to a broader array of legal issues
is inevitable."2 30 Psychology, in his view, "offers an empirical, sci-
entific source for theories of human behavior ' 231 that is superior to
the "ad hoc accounts" on which law has traditionally relied. In this
Article I have attempted to a certain extent to replace the ad hoc with
the scientific, but I have also undertaken to do something sui
generis: to use psychological research to predict the direction of so-
cietal change and hence new law. The primary impetus for this,
however, is similar to that of behavioral economics, in that without a
study of behavioral trends, particularly of trauma and recovery as
currently understood, our comprehension of the societal response to
9/11 will be incomplete. The primary drawbacks of linking trauma
study and the law are also similar to those faced by behavioral
economists, who repeatedly face criticism that they have created a
piece of the overall puzzle, not the grand solution.
Even with its generalizations, caveats and lacunae, the model I
have offered should provide some additional guidance in the current
chaos. Our political leaders and bumperstickers proclaim that
"America is united," but that only refers to support for immediate
military campaigns, not to a consensus about what needs to be done
in the aftermath of terror. In the discussion about 9/11, one cannot
satisfactorily find final resolution to the problem of terror and its
229. Id. (citing Rachlinski, supra note 216, at 750-52 (finding "As
Jeffrey Rachlinski has observed, the academic conventions in psy-
chology strongly rewarded the observation of empirically verifiable
decisional behaviors; there was relatively little effort directed to-
wards or reward given to attempts to generalize or systematize the
ensuing mass of observed behaviors.")).
230. Rachlinski, supra note 216, at 766.
231. Id.
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impact on society; we cannot say we should return to "normal" and
refuse to change because that would mean capitulation to terror, and
simultaneously say all the rules are now different. However, such is
consistent with a difficulty to discern that we will change as indi-
viduals and as a nation because 9/11 was a traumatic event. If study-
ing how we, as human beings, respond to the darkest events in our
human experience grants us greater clarity, this discourse will have
been worth the effort.
Some historians and other commentators may claim to already
know what changes the terrible and momentous event of 9/11 will
produce. They contend that 9/11 is one event in a march of history
that is bound to reach some universal end, such as widespread global
cooperation. 232 Some claim there is an equilibrium state of sorts in
our history, where bedrock principles endure despite shocks to the
system such as world wars. A different sort of mechanism may
help explain the new "normal" after 9/11. Such is a model that at-
tempts to describe our resilience as a function of our capacity to
adapt and of the resources developed during this process of recovery
and adaptation. The critical assumption of this model is that the
adaptive resources which are most pronounced will drive social
change. While considerable testing is required of this assumption, it
is in furtherance of an explanation of why traumatic events produce
sharp transformations in public policy. Such an inquiry is a consid-
erably more satisfying venture of study than a model which fails to
account for human behavior. 2
34
232. See generally ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF
HUMAN DESTINY (2000).
233. The central problem with this argument is that it inevitably
seems to be advanced by those who wish to advance their view of
these core principles, Constitutional or otherwise.
234. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 216, at 753 (noting with re-
spect to the anomalies discussed in behavioral economics that "[i]f
these [behavioral] phenomena are mental shortcuts that serve people
well, or even enhance their well-being, then crafting legal rules to
avoid them could do more harm than good.").
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